Thursday, January 20, 2011
Volvo said to use clout
to blunt Iran sanctions
Swedish defiance is leaked
as Obama pushes China trade
The automaker Volvo is among a powerful group of firms in Sweden resisting sanctions against Iran, according to a leaked State Department cable.
The leak came as President Obama upheld strong trade ties with China, despite concerns over its burgeoning military might and its support of North Korea and Iran, designated by Washington as "rogue states."
In February 2008, Sweden signed an investment treaty with Iran. The Swedish government is critical of Iran on human rights, but, the cable says, favors dialogue with Iran while encouraging trade -- paralleling U.S. arguments concerning trade with China, where human rights are strangled by the Communist Party.
U.S. observers, noting significant shifts in trade patterns, expressed a suspicion that Swedish firms were evading arms export control measures by trans-shipping militarily useful goods through United Arab Emirates middlemen, according to the cable, which came from the Wikileaks cache and which was published by Norway's Aftenposten newspaper.
Sweden favors its longstanding trade relations with Iran and is skeptical that many of the individuals and organizations on Washington's terrorism list are really involved in "problematic" business, according to the December 2009 report from U.S. diplomat Robert Silverman.
Volvo, which is Iran's top heavy truck seller; Ericsson, a major force in the global cell phone market; and ABB, which builds technologies for power companies and utilities globally, were among major firms behind the "Swedish government's reluctance to support further sanctions in Iran," Silverman reported.
Though Sweden blocks technology that could be used for nuclear weaponry or long-range missiles, the Swedish Trade Council, a government agency, actively promotes trade with Iran, Silverman said.
Sweden declines to keep close tabs on financial transactions with Iran, the cable says.
Per Saland, a Swedish sanctions coordinator, told David Cohen, a U.S. Treasury official assigned to crack down on terrorist financing, said in June 2009 that Sweden does not support attempts to scrutinize every transaction with Iran because "legitimate trade exists between Sweden and Iran," adding that the Swedish mindset on this point "will not change."
Sweden also remains unconvinced that many of the individuals and organizations designated as terror supporters are really involved in "problematic transactions" and would like to see an expanded dialogue between U.S. and Swedish experts on this topic, Saland told Silverman.
Per Saland, a Swedish sanctions coordinator, told David Cohen, a U.S. Treasury official assigned to crack down on terrorist financing, said in June 2009 that Sweden does not support attempts to scrutinize every transaction with Iran because "legitimate trade exists between Sweden and Iran," adding that the Swedish mindset on this point "will not change."
Sweden also remains unconvinced that many of the individuals and organizations designated as terror supporters are really involved in "problematic transactions" and would like to see an expanded dialogue between U.S. and Swedish experts on this topic, Saland told Silverman.
Also, Sweden refused a suggestion by Washington that it monitor the financial transactions of Swedish immigrants of Iranian origin, saying that civil liberties were at stake, the cable says.
The Iranian immigrant community in Sweden, at roughly 100,000, is one of the largest in Europe.
English-language web sites of Swedish entities are much scantier about business dealings with Iran than are the Swedish-language websites of the same organizations, the Stockholm embassy reported.
Swedish authorities are demanding that Julian Assange, the Wikileaks founder who was granted journalistic status by a Swedish newspaper, be extradited from London to Sweden for "questioning" about sex charges that were originally dropped but then revived by a higher level official. It is not known whether the potential for official embarrassments by Wikileaks played a role in the reinstatement of the case.
Cable, as published by Aftenposten, follows:
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 000778
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019 TAGS: ECON, ETRD, ETTC, PGOV, PREL, IR, SW SUBJECT: SWEDISH-IRANIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS: BUSINESS AS USUAL, RESISTANCE TO FINANCIAL SANCTIONS
REF: A. STOCKHOLM 464 B. 08 STOCKHOLM 717 C. 08 STOCKHOLM 431
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Silverman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary: Behind the Swedish governments reluctance to support further sanctions in Iran, especially unilateral European measures, is a dynamic (though still fairly small) trade involving some of Swedens largest and most politically well-connected companies: Volvo, Ericsson and ABB to name three. Embassy Stockholm discusses Iran with Foreign Minister Bildt and his deputies regularly and increasingly.
-- On export controls, Sweden has a policy of complying with UN sanctions banning the sale and delivery of technology and equipment that may contribute to nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. However, in repeated demarches on the activities of Swedish companies, for example Mahaco (brokering activities) and Colenco (light water reactor technology), the Swedes were passive and moved very slowly, referring repeatedly to either EU legislation or lack of Swedish legislation that prevents them from acting on Swedish companies (Reftel c).
-- On Swedish exports to and investment in Iran more generally, the Swedish Trade Council, a government agency, actively promotes trade with Iran.
-- On financial sanctions, Per Saland, Sanctions Coordinator at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs Department for Security Policy, told U.S. Treasury Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing David Cohen in June 2009 that Sweden does not support attempts to scrutinize every transaction with Iran because "legitimate trade exists between Sweden and Iran," adding that the Swedish mindset on this point "will not change." (Reftel A). End Summary.
Background ----------
2. (C) The Iranian immigrant community in Sweden, at roughly 100,000, is one of the largest in Europe. In the context of discussions on restricting of financial transfers by Swedish citizens of Iranian origin, Sanctions Coordinator Saland told us that the Swedish government will not take any actions that might restrict their civil liberties.
3. (C) In February 2008, Sweden signed a bilateral investment treaty with Iran. The Swedish government is critical of Iran where human rights are concerned, but advocates maintaining a dialogue with Iran and encourages trade with Iran (see paragraph 9).
Sweden Follows UN Sanctions ---------------------------
4. (S) Sweden does not have any national sanctions against Iran, but Swedish companies are expected to comply with UN sanctions implemented by the EU, which primarily ban the sale and delivery of technology and equipment which may contribute to the development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. However, in repeated demarches on Mahaco (brokering activities) and Colenco (a Swiss company owned by a Swedish company providing light water reactor technology), the Swedes were passive and reluctant to cooperate. Where the Swedish company Mahaco is concerned, the government and the Inspectorate for Strategic Products (ISP) have been passive and very slow to react or take steps, referring repeatedly to either EU legislation or a lack of Swedish legislation that prevents them from acting on the Swedish company (Reftel C).
5. (C) Sanctions Coordinator Saland told us that Sweden does not support implementing tighter financial sanctions on Iran and that more stringent financial standards could hurt Swedish exports (Reftel B). Saland has also said that Sweden cannot do more than it is already doing as Swedish legislation does not allow the government to pressure Swedish banks and companies to stop doing business with Iranian entities (Reftel A). Saland told U.S. Treasury Assistant Secretary David Cohen in June 2009 that Sweden does not support attempts to scrutinize every transaction with Iran because "legitimate trade exists between Sweden and Iran," adding that the Swedish mindset on this point "will not
change." (Reftel A). Sweden also remains unconvinced that many of the individuals and organizations designated under U.S. domestic legislation are really involved in problematic transactions and would like to see an expanded dialogue between U.S. and Swedish experts on this topic, according to Saland.
Trade with Iran ---------------
6. (U) The Swedish Trade Council considers Iran to be one of Swedens most important non-European export markets. Up until the 1979 Iranian revolution, Sweden was, in value terms, the 15th largest exporter to Iran. A number of Swedish companies operate their own subsidiaries in Iran, such as telecom giant Ericsson, the engineering companies ABB and Alfa-Laval, the mining companies Atlas-Copco and Svedala and the processing and packaging company Tetra-Pak. The largest Swedish exporter to Iran is Volvo AB, which manufactures trucks, buses and marine engines. Volvo AB is represented by Rena Technical Company, Bahar Rastar and Saipa Diesel Co, all located in Tehran. Volvo Trucks has delivered more than 60,000 Volvo trucks to Iran since 1934, making Volvo the leading heavy truck company in Iran. Iran is Swedens second largest export market in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia. According to a recent report in the German press repeated in the International Herald Tribune on December 1, Volvo has stepped in to fill the gap resulting from a Daimler decision to stop delivery of vehicles with three axles to Iran and is now exporting similar vehicles to Iran.
7. (U) Embassy Stockholm previously reported a significant difference in the information about doing business with Iran available on Swedish-language websites, compared with what was available on the English-language websites of the same organizations (Reftel A). The Swedish government continues to promote trade with Iran despite the fact that our interlocutors have told the USG otherwise. The Swedish Export Credit Guarantee Board 2007 Annual Reports stated there has been a "greater demand for risk cover for deliveries to the Middle East, above all to Iran in 2007." In 2007, Iran ranked first on the list of top ten countries for which export guarantees were issued for large companies, and fourth on the list for small and medium-sized companies.
8. (U) Swedish exports to Iran are slowly moving in the direction of 2005 levels, which were $1.1 billion, accounting for nearly 1% of total Swedish exports (Reftel B). Sweden doubled its exports to Iran from 2007 to 2008, rising from $313.6 million to $627.3 million. The Swedish Trade Council claims that exports to Iran accounted for 0.20% in 2007 and 0.39% in 2008 of total Swedish exports. The International Monetary Fund, whose statistics might be more accurate or measure exports in a different manner, puts the figures at 0.53% for 2007 and 0.60% for 2008. According to Swedish Trade Council and Statistics Sweden, the share of total Swedish exports to Iran increased from $202.6 million (0.2%) for the period January-June 2008 to $245.5 million (0.4%) for the first six months in 2009. While these figures are small, they indicate that trade is rising, which is not the message that Post has received in meetings with Swedish interlocutors. On July 30, the Swedish embassy in Iran and the Swedish Trade Council canceled until further notice a planned visit to Iran due to what Swedish Ambassador to Iran Magnus Wernstedt called "turbulence in Iran and the uncertainty of the situation following the Iranian elections." The 15-20 Swedish companies that had planned to participate in the trade delegation included major exporters, such as Ericsson, ABB, Atlas Copco, Alfa Laval, Tetra Pak and SKF. (Note: Ericsson, Atlas Copco and SKF, a company that manufactures rolling bearings, seals, mechatronics and lubrication solutions, are controlled by the Wallenberg family, which owns the majority of voting shares in these companies. End Note).
9. (U) In March 2009, the Swedish Trade Council in the Middle East developed a Swedish language "Iran Fact Pack" Powerpoint presentation to encourage trade between Sweden and Iran. This presentation provides a geographic, demographic and economic overview of Iran, utilizing statistics from 2006 through 2008. According to the presentation, Iran ranked 31 among Swedish export markets and 26 among Swedish import markets in 2006, the most recent figures provided. A graph shows that Swedish exports to Iran declined by 12.6 percent from 2004 to 2007, but does not show any figures for 2008 or
STOCKHOLM 00000778 003 OF 004
2009. Another slide states that Swedish exports of construction and mining equipment to Iran increased in 2007, and that 112 Swedish companies do business in Iran, some via local partners or distributors. Companies listed include: ABB, Alfa Laval, Atlas-Copco, Ericsson, GAC, Getinge, Scania, SKF, Tetra Pak and Volvo Trucks. One slide also lists the following business opportunities that Iran offers Swedish companies:
- Economic "free zones" where companies can establish an initial presence. - Low costs that make Iran an attractive market for production. - A large pool of well-educated labor. - Up to 100 percent foreign ownership of Iranian companies with the Iranian governments permission. - A bilateral investment protection agreement between Sweden and Iran.
The presentation concludes by mentioning that "The Swedish Trade Council in the Middle East makes it easier for Swedish companies to establish operations or develop business in Iran," and states that the Swedish Trade Council maintains offices in Dubai, Riyadh and Cairo staffed by 15 consultants.
Swedish exports to Iran decrease, but increase to the UAE --------------------------------------------- ------------
10. (U) In examining Swedish-Iranian trade statistics for the first half of 2009, we noticed a trend of decreased exports to Iran and increased exports to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in certain product categories. The following product categories display this relationship (Source: Statistics Sweden).
- Other Inorganic Basic Chemicals: Exports to Iran decreased from $501,444 to $25,419 (94.9%) from 2007 to 2008. Export to UAE increased from $3.9 million to $7.2 million (84.4%) from 2007 to 2008.
- Explosives: Exports to Iran decreased from $255,116 to $0 (100%) from 2007 to 2008. Exports to UAE increased from $80,736 to $222,530 (175.7%) from 2007 to 2008.
- Aluminum Mills: Exports to Iran decreased from $32,993 to $7,582 (77%) from 2007 to 2008. Exports to UAE increased from $578,707 to $2.2 million (286%) from 2007 to 2008.
- Other Metal Mills: Exports to Iran decreased from $2 million to $418,375 (79.5%) from 2007 to 2008. Exports to UAE increased from $3,513 to $143,183 (3,796%) from 2007 to 2008.
- Engines and Turbines (not including aircraft and Cycle engines): Exports to Iran decreased from $39.9 million to $25.6 million (35.9%) from 2007 to 2008. Exports to UAE increased from $36.8 million to $51.1 million (38.8%) from 2007 to 2008.
- Motor Vehicle Bodies, Trailers and Semi-Trailers: Exports to Iran decreased from $582,034 to $76,827 (86.8%) from 2007 to 2008. Exports to UAE increased from $76,125 to $212,223 (178.8%) from 2007 to 2008.
While we cannot say whether Sweden is transshipping goods to Iran via the UAE based on the above-mentioned statistics, these figures could indicate a nascent trend in this direction. Embassy Stockholm discusses Iran with Foreign Minister Bildt and his deputies regularly and increasingly.
11. (C) Comment: It is difficult to get a fully accurate picture of Swedens economic relations with Iran. For example, statistics on Swedens foreign direct investments (FDI) for 2007 (2008 figures are not available) do not list Iran separately, which could indicate that FDI in Iran was an insignificant amount, or could reflect a conscious decision to place Iran under the category: "Other Countries."
STOCKHOLM 00000778 004 OF 004
BARZUN
+++
+++
Wednesday, January 19, 2011
Did Pentagon quietly aid Wikileaks
in ploy to neuter China cyber thefts?
Was the leak of a cache of Pentagon and State Department messages an inside job by intelligence professionals, with Private Bradley Manning either a dupe or a fall guy?
Daniel Flitton, diplomatic editor for Australia's serious newspaper, the Age, points out that national security computer networks are a target of cyber-spies and argues that "it's a good bet that if Manning had the ability and opportunity to tear the guts out of America's classified computer system, the Russian and Chinese intelligence services did too."
The Wikileaks trove reportedly originated in the U.S. Central Command (Centcom), which oversees military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Centcom is also the point where a massive breach of security reportedly occurred in 2008. Both Russia and China were suspects -- with most suspicion centered on China -- in the siphoning of a large amount of military information.
in ploy to neuter China cyber thefts?
Was the leak of a cache of Pentagon and State Department messages an inside job by intelligence professionals, with Private Bradley Manning either a dupe or a fall guy?
Daniel Flitton, diplomatic editor for Australia's serious newspaper, the Age, points out that national security computer networks are a target of cyber-spies and argues that "it's a good bet that if Manning had the ability and opportunity to tear the guts out of America's classified computer system, the Russian and Chinese intelligence services did too."
The Wikileaks trove reportedly originated in the U.S. Central Command (Centcom), which oversees military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Centcom is also the point where a massive breach of security reportedly occurred in 2008. Both Russia and China were suspects -- with most suspicion centered on China -- in the siphoning of a large amount of military information.
http://www.acus.org/natosource/2008-attack-centcom-computers-confirmed
Suppose the information the adversary obtained included traffic on the SIPDIS network, which carried both diplomatic and military messages? That would mean that Beijing (probably) would hold an advantage whereby it could use the secret diplomatic cables in the poker games of international diplomacy, selectively leaking tidbits to non-U.S. envoys for diplomatic advantage.
Such a situation, the thinking goes, would be intolerable for the national security elite in Washington. What to do? The best bet would be to go public with all -- or much of -- the stolen data. But simply declassifying it would be politically and diplomatically untenable.
A veteran intelligence officer, such as Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates who spent much of his career in the CIA, might well appreciate the need for a type of operation familiar from the Cold War era. Just have Wikileaks obtain the trove and pin the deed on some hapless private. It has been reported that before the data cache was dumped, Centcom loosened its security protocols to permit the uploading of the entire data base onto a flash drive.
And, to add to the cover story's professionalism, make sure to leak some documents created well after the Centcom system was compromised.
None of this implies awareness of such a ruse by Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman or Rep. Peter T. King, chairmen of the Senate and House homeland security committees who both used heated rhetoric in denouncing Assange and Wikileaks. Intelligence professionals are notoriously shrewd about oversight. And President Obama may have been shielded under the rule that the "old man" must not be exposed by being told of such an affair.
Suppose the information the adversary obtained included traffic on the SIPDIS network, which carried both diplomatic and military messages? That would mean that Beijing (probably) would hold an advantage whereby it could use the secret diplomatic cables in the poker games of international diplomacy, selectively leaking tidbits to non-U.S. envoys for diplomatic advantage.
Such a situation, the thinking goes, would be intolerable for the national security elite in Washington. What to do? The best bet would be to go public with all -- or much of -- the stolen data. But simply declassifying it would be politically and diplomatically untenable.
A veteran intelligence officer, such as Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates who spent much of his career in the CIA, might well appreciate the need for a type of operation familiar from the Cold War era. Just have Wikileaks obtain the trove and pin the deed on some hapless private. It has been reported that before the data cache was dumped, Centcom loosened its security protocols to permit the uploading of the entire data base onto a flash drive.
And, to add to the cover story's professionalism, make sure to leak some documents created well after the Centcom system was compromised.
None of this implies awareness of such a ruse by Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman or Rep. Peter T. King, chairmen of the Senate and House homeland security committees who both used heated rhetoric in denouncing Assange and Wikileaks. Intelligence professionals are notoriously shrewd about oversight. And President Obama may have been shielded under the rule that the "old man" must not be exposed by being told of such an affair.
But it is pretty much inconceivable that Gates would have been out of the loop. The same cannot be said for Hillary Clinton, the secretary of state; Leon Panetta, the CIA's political chief; and the harried James R. Clapper, whose role appears to be largely that of a political liaison.
And avoiding much of the prevailing Assange-as-demon hyperbole was none other than... Robert Gates.
Rejecting much of the official and unofficial criticism as "significantly overwrought," Gates said the WikiLeaks disclosures would prove "embarrassing" and "awkward" but would have only "modest consequences."
"Now I've heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a meltdown, as a game-changer and so on. I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought," Gates told a news conference. "The fact is governments deal with the United States because it is in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us and not because they believe we can keep secrets. "
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/checkpoint-washington/2010/11/the_obama_administration_has_w.html
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2011/01/19/wikileaks/index.html
However, that doesn't mean that Gates and his national security associates are terribly concerned about the fates of Manning or Julian Assange. Like Manning, if he is indeed a culprit, Assange would be considered as a "useful idiot" or dupe. Similarly, various other journalists involved in the leaks would be counted as unwitting conduits of a clever stratagem.
From Assange's point of view, he takes information where he can get it. It's a given among reporters, police officers and intelligence agents that information is often volunteered to further some agenda or other. Yet that doesn't mean the information isn't worth using.
As a final point, the blog Threat Level once ridiculed the idea that Centcom had been compromised. But then Threat Level has posted quite a few items which, taken as a whole, appear to run interference for the Pentagon.
Another scenario had Israel's supporters orchestrating the Wikileaks cache to further Israel's foreign policy. But Assange has since pointed out that editors at the New York Times, the Guardian and other news organizations had decided against publishing sensitive cables about Israel. A few such cables have surfaced after Aftenposten of Oslo got hold of the Wikileaks cache.
+
Sunday, January 16, 2011
China cautioned on aiding
Iranian missile prowess
Behind Iran's acquisition of potent weaponry lurks the Chinese colossus.
Washington and London urged Beijing to take steps to make sure that materials that can be used in advanced weapons systems do not again find their way from China to Iran, according to a secret State Department cable which found its way to Norway's Aftenposten newspaper and is part of the Wikileaks cache of cables.
A ship that went from China to Iran carrying cargo that can be used to produce solid rocket fuel was the cause of concern. Solid fuel is prized by military rocketeers because of the extra launch punch and the rapid acceleration of the missile. A solid fuel missile tipped with a nuclear warhead would pose a grave regional military situation.
The cable does not say that Chinese government officials or the Communist politburo approved of the transfer. However, there has been increasing concern over China's diplomatic and military moves, with some observers charging that either the civilian leadership does not have firm control of the military or that China plays a double game with the West: making placating public statements while strongly pursuing an aggressive agenda at odds with these pronouncements.
Cable follows:
2.9.2008: SHIPMENT OF CHINESE ORIGIN GOODS DESTINED FOR IRAN
S E C R E T STATE 093558
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2033 TAGS: PARM, PREL, IR, CH, UK, AS
SUBJECT: (S) SHIPMENT OF CHINESE ORIGIN GOODS DESTINED FOR IRAN
Classified By: EAP Acting DAS John Norris, E.O. 12958 Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S) ACTION REQUEST: Washington has information about a Chinese origin shipment of proliferation concern that arrived in Bandar Abbas, Iran on 21 June. This cargo was conveyed to Iran on the IRISL merchant vessel "Iran Broojerdi" and was consigned to companies associated with designated entities in Iran. Washington requests that Embassy Beijing demarche appropriate Chinese officials and urge China to investigate this shipment, provide us with the results of that investigation, and prevent future transfers of a similar nature. Post should also inform counterparts at the British Embassy in Beijing of our plans to deliver this demarche. Post should draw on any relevant background and provide the non-paper in para 6.
---------- OBJECTIVES ----------
2. (S/Rel China) Embassy Beijing is requested to:
-- Inform appropriate Chinese officials of this shipment of proliferation concern and that we are reinforcing the message that the British delivered on this same cargo last month.
-- Reinforce that our information, like that of the British, indicates that this shipment was destined for entities designated in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737.
-- Note that in view of Irans refusal to address international concerns about its nuclear programs and its record as a serial proliferator that supports international terrorism, the United States views with serious concern any export of items with potential WMD applications to end-users designated under UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747.
-- Remind interlocutors that the U.S. takes very seriously WMD related shipments to Iranian entities and urge China to contribute to our joint non-proliferation efforts as embodied in UNSCRs 1737, 1747 and 1803 (which China voted for) and take action to investigate this shipment and prevent such shipments in the future.
---------- BACKGROUND ----------
3. (S/Rel China) The IRISL merchant vessel "Iran Broojerdi" traveled from Dalian, China, to Bandar Abbas, Iran, with several cargoes of proliferation concern. In particular, it was carrying 208 metric tons of potassium perchlorate, which can be used as a propellant for artillery rockets and can potentially be used to produce the solid rocket propellant oxidizer ammonium perchlorate, and liquid poly butadiene rubber, which is used commercially to produce a number of rubber products. However, liquid poly butadiene can also be used to produce binders used in solid rocket propellant. The potassium perchlorate and liquid polybutadiene are consigned to Aban Commercial and Industrial Group, which is associated with Irans solid-propellant missile organization SBIG. SBIG is also designated in UNSCR 1737. Additionally, Chinas Zhejiang Qingji Industrial Company, Ltd shipped a dewatering machine on the Broojerdi that is consigned to a firm that is associated with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and is a known procurement agent for Irans Defense Industries Organization (DIO). Both AEOI and DIO are designated entities and subject to the asset freeze provision of UNSCR 1737, para 12. This model dewatering machine is an industrial, two-stage centrifuge used to separate liquids from solids. This particular machine has a capacity of separating 20 tons per hour of solid matter and it appears to have a lot of industrial uses.
4. (S/Rel China and UK) We have raised the issue of transfers of items of proliferation concern to entities designated in UNSCRs repeatedly with Chinese officials. However, we continue to see shipments of Chinese goods intended for companies associated with entities in Iran designated in UNSCRs 1737 and 1747. China has noted in occasional responses to such information that the uncontrolled nature of the goods does not dictate a prohibition.
5. (S/Rel UK) In June 2008, while this shipment was en route to Iran, the UK approached Chinese officials in Beijing and objected to the transfer. We would like to support the UK demarche, underline our own opposition to such transfers to Iran, and remind Chinese officials of our common interest in enforcing UNSCR 1737, 1747 and 1803. Washington has confirmed that the information in the attached non-paper is identical to that which the UK passed to the PRC in June 2008.
-------------- BEGIN NONPAPER --------------
6. (S/Rel China)
-- In the spirit of our nonproliferation cooperation, we would like to bring to your attention a shipment of proliferation concern that occurred in May and June 2008 from China to Iran.
-- Our information indicates that a Chinese firm, Dalian North Potassium Chlorate Works, booked a cargo of 208 metric tons of potassium perchlorate and liquid poly butadiene rubber (LPBR) for shipment from Dalian, China to Bandar Abbas, Iran. The cargo was to be loaded into 13 20-foot containers and shipped under provisional invoice #14640/2/25875. The bills of lading for this cargo were IRSLPJL1860ISH2289 and IRSLPJL1860ISH2284.
-- Dalian North Potassium Chlorate Works produces a variety of perchlorate and chlorate products, including potassium perchlorate and sodium perchlorate. LPBR is a generic term that may refer to a number of poly butadiene-based chemicals, some of which are controlled under the MTCR for their use as binders in solid propellant composites. The cargo was probably loaded at Dalian in late May aboard the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) vessel M/V Iran Broojerdi.
-- In addition, we believe that the M/V Iran Broojerdi loaded a model P-60 dewatering machine at Tianjin, China. This model dewatering machine is an industrial, two stage centrifuge used to separate liquids from solids. The details regarding the shipment of the dewatering machine are as follows:
-- Commodity description: Dewatering machine model P-60, 31 items of related spare parts: - Shipper Zhejiang Qingji Industrial Company, Ltd. - Consignee: The Sara Company - Notify Address: The Sara Company - Bill of Lading: IRSLPJL1860ISH2279 - Freight Provisional Invoice Number: 14640/2/25822 - Packing: Three wooden cases - Weight: 11.500 metric tons - Volume: 35.320 cubic meters
-- Our information indicates that the Sara Company is associated with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and has procured items from other Chinese firms in the past on behalf of Irans Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and for the DIO subsidiary Parchin Chemicals Industries (PCI). These firms are designated in United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1737 and 1747 and, in accord with para 12 of UNSCR 1737, all states must ensure that "any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available(to or for the benefit of these(entities."
-- Given Irans refusal to address international concerns about its nuclear programs and its record as a serial proliferator that supports international terrorism, the United States views with serious concern any export of items with potential WMD applications to end-users designated under UN Security Council Resolutions. Transactions such as these send the wrong signal by reinforcing the perception in Iran that it can continue to reject P5 1 demands with impunity. We ask that China investigate the transaction described above, share the results, and continue to do what it can to prevent future transfers of a similar nature.
----------------------------- Reporting Requirement and POC ------------------------------------
7. (U) Please report delivery of cable and any immediate response by September 15. .
8. (U) Washington point-of-contact for follow-up information is Mark Felipe,(202) 647-5376, . Please slug all responses for ISN, T, EAP, and EUR. Washington appreciates Posts assistance. RICE
Friday, January 14, 2011
Bioweaponry a concern
Chinese spies said to target
genetic engineering secrets
China is suspected of conducting industrial espionage against Icelandic firms in the areas of DNA decoding and medical research, according to a leaked State Department cable.
"It is believed that the Chinese are conducting industrial espionage in the areas of DNA
decoding and medical research in Iceland," wrote Ambassador
Carol Van Voorst in a 2009 report published on the Wikileaks site.
Over the past couple of decades, there has been a growing number of scholarly reports that speak of China’s beefed up prowess in economic espionage, according to experts.
Genetic engineering has become an area of ferocious competition, with private sector firms and governments alike hungry for the latest developments. Such knowledge is important for medical breakthroughs on the one hand and for research into biological weapons of mass destruction on the other.
Espionage on recombinant DNA research would not only give China advantages in the international pharmaceutical market but also, potentially, additions to its military arsenal. China's military modernization has become increasingly worrisome to policymakers.
(Cable is below.)
******************************
Commentary
The Arizona shooter reportedly told a surprised college class that 6 and 18 are the same number. This is likely a reference to the fact that 18 = 6+6+6, which is a form of the demonic number much favored by adolescents and horror movies. So should we advocate curtailment of horror films on grounds that the disturbed might be incited? Or, maybe we should urge that the Bible, where the number is mentioned in the Book of Revelation, be removed from bookshelves...
******************************
09REYKJAVIK41 2009-02-26 15:03 2011-01-13 05:05 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Reykjavik
R 261501Z FEB 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3993
INFO CIA WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
FBI WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T REYKJAVIK 000041
NOFORN
DEPT FOR DS/TIA/ITA AND DS/IP/EUR AND EUR/NB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2019
TAGS: ASEC PTER
SUBJECT: REYKJAVIK SEPQ RESPONSE - SPRING 2009
REF: STATE 13023
Classified By: RSO JON MOODY FOR REASONS 1.4 (C) AND (D)
------------------
POLITICAL VIOLENCE
------------------
¶I. (C) Demonstrations
¶A. (C) There is a religious community of Muslims, some of
whom might harbor anti-American sentiments. The community
numbers approximately 800 individuals and is comprised mostly
of European Muslims. In the past 12 months there have been
no known anti-American demonstrations led by the Muslim
community.
i. (SBU) Yes, there have been two anti-American
demonstrations in the past 12 months.
ii. (SBU) Both demonstrations occurred in front of the
Chancery and CMR. (NOTE: The Chancery and CMR are co-located
at 21 and 23 Laufasvegur. END NOTE)
iii. (SBU) One demonstration drew 30-40 protesters.
Approximately 400 demonstrators participated in the second
demonstration.
iv. (SBU) The two anti-American protests in this SEPQ period
occurred in December 2008 and January 2009. Both were
related to Israeli military action in Gaza.
¶B. (SBU) Demonstrations are generally peaceful.
i. (SBU) There have been no violent demonstrations resulting
in damage or loss of USG property.
ii. (SBU) No demonstrations have penetrated our perimeter
security.
¶C. (SBU) There has been a dramatic increase in
demonstrations against the Icelandic government since Post's
last SEPQ response. The primary cause is the current
domestic economic crisis. Demonstrations have also been
organized to protest military action, environmental issues,
salary/benefit disputes, soaring gas prices, and a NATO
conference.
i. (SBU) The majority of demonstrations occur in front of
the Prime Minister's office (approximately 700 meters from
the Embassy) and the Althingi Parliament Building
(approximately 550 meters from the Embassy). Since Post,s
last SEPQ response there have been approximately 57
demonstrations against the Government of Iceland. Most were
peaceful, some were heated, and a small number of protesters
were arrested. Several police officers were injured by
throwing rocks, none seriously.
ii. (SBU) The anti-government protests were huge compared to
previously seen protests. Since October Saturday
demonstrations have drawn between 3000-4000 participants.
The largest gathering was estimated at 10000 demonstrators
(approximately 3 percent of Iceland's population).
Non-economic protests were usually drew 30-50 persons (one
protest had 1 participant - an anti-NATO demonstrator man
banging a gong outside the Hilton. He was issued a traffic
citation for parking illegally.)
iii. (C) All demonstrations have been peaceful, to date.
The protests regarding the economic crisis have occasionally
become heated resulting in minor injuries and arrests. None
got out of hand and most of the damage and injuries were
caused by a small group of miscreants well-known to the
police and rumored to be in a turf war, with the police.
iv. (SBU) No demonstrations have resulted in damage to USG
property.
II (SBU) Macro Conflict Conditions
¶A. (SBU) Iceland is not involved in an interstate or
intrastate conflict.
¶B. (SBU) Iceland is not involved in an intrastate conflict.
¶C. (SBU) Iceland is not involved in an interstate or
intrastate conflict. The only US diplomatic mission is in
Reykjavik.
¶D. (SBU) Iceland is not involved in an intrastate conflict.
III. (S/NF) Host Country Capabilities
¶A. (C) The police (Logreglan) are well-trained and
professional. All police attend the national police academy
with a comprehensive curriculum. The current number of
police officers in Iceland is 780 (1 police officer for every
409 citizens). A newspaper article on 12 February 2009
claims the Metropolitan Police (Reykjavik) is in dire
financial straits. Costs relating to the demonstrations are
piling up with no funds to cover them in the budget. The
Police Commissioner is fearful that police officer positions
will be cut to offset those expenses. Such a cut will be
detrimental to a police force that has only 20-25 officers on
patrol during any shift.
¶B. (SBU) Icelandic police have been trained by US agencies
in various areas including customs/border/port security,
cyber security and computer crimes, hostage negotiation,
crisis management, and several others. The training has been
effective. The RSO notes evidence of the training in his
interactions with the police. There has been no training
since Post,s last SEPQ response.
¶C. (C) No evidence of corruption has been observed or
uncovered.
¶D. (S/NF) Iceland does not have an intelligence service.
The National Security Unit (NSU) within the National
Commissioner's Office handles threat information analysis.
The NSU is comprised of three individuals. The NSU is too
small to undertake any type of intelligence gathering role
and responds to threats as they arise, such as threats
against Icelandic officials, demonstrations/protests, and
"extremist" groups. The NSU is not a tradecraft or covert
group. There are no terrorism-related examples, but the
NSU's investigative and analytical capabilities have been
demonstrated through operations in varying fields of law
enforcement such as organized crime (OC), counterintelligence
(CI), and counter-narcotics (CN). GRPO maintains liaison
with the NSU.
¶E. (SBU) Law enforcement agencies, including the NSU, have
been very cooperative with US Embassy requests for
information and support.
¶F. (U) N/A
¶G. (SBU) All planned requests for support were fully
completed in a timely and thorough manner. All impromptu
requests for support were responded to within minutes.
¶H. (C) The overall assessment of security at the major
airport in Iceland is excellent. Screening is comparable to
US standards and perimeter security is well-organized and
implemented. There are direct flights into and out of the
US. The Transportation and Security Administration (TSA) is
closely involved with the security requirements/standards at
Keflavik International Airport (KEF). The Keflavik Airport
Authority changed hands on 1 January 2009. Security
responsibilities are now handled by a private limited company
owned by the government. The current Director of Security
was the Acting Airport Managing Director prior to the change.
¶I. (C) The customs and immigration controls at KEF are
effective. The Sudurnes Police District, the district
responsible for the airport, has a high success rate of
intercepting contraband and suspect travel documents. The
police monitor passenger manifests prior to aircraft arrival
(Advanced Passenger Information - API) and compare the list
against several databases, including Interpol and Europol.
The police possess a fraudulent document lab at the airport
that deals with the fraudulent travel documents. Although
the numbers of events and personnel are relatively low, their
effectiveness is high. As of 1 January 2009, the customs
authority now falls under the Ministry of Finance but is
currently still operationally-controlled by the Sudurnes
Police Commissioner. This change-over is a work in progress.
Eventually the Commissioner will have no responsibility or
oversight of Customs at Keflavik.
¶J. (C) Border patrol forces are effective. Police and
customs interdict narcotics on a somewhat regular basis. The
police do recognize the possibility that their borders could
be infiltrated by rogue individuals using small seacraft and
thus rely upon the Icelandic Coast Guard (ICG) for patrolling
the waters. The ICG has made severe cuts to their personnel
and have limited their activities to rescue operations and
training necessary to maintain proficiency operating their
helicopters, aircraft and vessels.
--------------------
INDIGENOUS TERRORISM
--------------------
¶I. (C) Anti-American Terrorist Groups
¶A. (C) There are no known indigenous anti-American terrorist
groups.
¶B. (U) N/A
¶C. (U) N/A
¶D. (U) N/A
¶E. (U) N/A
¶F. (U) N/A
¶G. (U) N/A
II. (C) Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups
¶A. (C) There are no known other indigenous terrorist groups
in Iceland.
¶B. (U) N/A
¶C. (U) N/A
¶D. (U) N/A
-----------------------
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
-----------------------
¶I. (S/NF) Transnational Terrorism Indicators
¶A. (C) There are no known foreign terrorist groups in
Iceland.
¶B. (U) N/A
¶C. (C) The host government is not sympathetic to foreign
terrorism groups in general.
¶D. (C) Within the Muslim community and others outside the
Muslim community, there might be a small number that support
the actions of terrorism groups against the US. The numbers
or make-up of possible supporters are not known. Any support
to foreign terrorism groups is not overt.
¶E. (S/NF) The Russians and Chinese have established
diplomatic missions in Reykjavik. There are no indications
that these two countries are actively pursuing intelligence
operations against the USG. It is believed that the Chinese
are conducting industrial espionage in the areas of DNA
decoding and medical research in Iceland.
¶F. (S/NF) There are no indications of hostile intelligence
services in Iceland with the intent or aim to conduct
potential anti-American attacks. (NOTE: Iran, Iraq, Syria,
Serbia, Sudan, etc. do not have diplomatic missions in
Iceland. The 14 declared, diplomatic missions in Iceland are
the US, Danish, Swedish, French, German, Indian, British,
Chinese, Russian, Polish, Canadian, Finnish, Japanese, and
Norwegian. END NOTE)
¶G. (S) There are no indications that weapons or explosives
are readily available to potential hostile terrorist
elements. There are approximately 52,000 firearms registered
with the National Commissioner,s Office.
van Voorst
Wednesday, January 12, 2011
China's snub follows
story on leaked cable
The cable, from the Wikileaks cache, said that China's increased bullying at the diplomatic level lacked military credibility.
Purportedly the military failed to alert the civilian leadership of the test Tuesday, just hours before Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates sat down with President Hu Jintao to discuss frayed relations.
Gates told reporters that Hu told him that the test “had absolutely nothing to do with my visit."
Asked whether he believed Hu, Gates said, “I take President Hu at his word.”
On Jan. 8, News from Limbo ran a story headlined "U.S. envoy sees little threat from China's rough tactics" and quoted a senior U.S. diplomat, Robert Goldberg, as seeing more swagger than threat from China's new "global assertiveness."
Goldberg entitled his 2009 report from Beijing Stomp around and carry a small stick: China's new 'global assertiveness' raise hackles, but has more form than substance.
The cable was published by Oslo's Aftenposten newspaper but News from Limbo was evidently the first to highlight Goldberg's assessment.
story on leaked cable
Envoy had laughed off Beijing might
as first reported by News from Limbo
as first reported by News from Limbo
Rather than tolerate a loss of face from a leaked State Department cable, the Chinese military apparently retaliated by conducting a test flight of a new stealth fighter, a stunt that undermined a high-profile visit to Beijing by the U.S. defense secretary.
The cable, from the Wikileaks cache, said that China's increased bullying at the diplomatic level lacked military credibility.
Purportedly the military failed to alert the civilian leadership of the test Tuesday, just hours before Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates sat down with President Hu Jintao to discuss frayed relations.
Gates told reporters that Hu told him that the test “had absolutely nothing to do with my visit."
Asked whether he believed Hu, Gates said, “I take President Hu at his word.”
On Jan. 8, News from Limbo ran a story headlined "U.S. envoy sees little threat from China's rough tactics" and quoted a senior U.S. diplomat, Robert Goldberg, as seeing more swagger than threat from China's new "global assertiveness."
Goldberg entitled his 2009 report from Beijing Stomp around and carry a small stick: China's new 'global assertiveness' raise hackles, but has more form than substance.
The cable was published by Oslo's Aftenposten newspaper but News from Limbo was evidently the first to highlight Goldberg's assessment.
Tuesday, January 11, 2011
It's another cold war
Brrr... Kremlin frosts up
over 'Arctic' video game
Video game fanatics face yet one more challenge. The Kremlin is on the look-out for computer games that besmirch Vladimir Putin's regime, a leaked State Department cable reveals.
Putin's hand-picked foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, put the game Naval War: Arctic Circle in the diplomatic cross-hairs, arguing that a private firm, Turbo Tape Games, depicts Russia as the enemy in a conflict over Arctic resources.
Lavrov cited the game in his complaint to Norway Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere that Norway had been unnecessarily escalating tensions over the matter of Arctic resources. Despite the protest at the 2009 meeting, the computer game was released last year.
Lavrov's awareness demonstrated "impressive research" by the Russians well in advance of the game's release to the public, the cable noted in an apparent reference to the Kremlin's reputation for espionage. However, it was unclear whether deep-cover Russian moles were behind the video game caper.
The video game contretemps came to light in a confidential report from the U.S. embassy in Oslo that was leaked to Wikileaks and found its way to Oslo's Aftenposten newspaper.
Lavrov also told Stoere that he was appalled by the security problems in Afghanistan, where Norwegian troops are aiding the NATO-led war, and said Russia was considering offering training and small arms assistance to the Afghan police.
On Iran, Lavrov welcomed U.S. engagement and said that Iran is ready to use its leverage in the region positively, but needs to know what they will receive in return, the cable says. Without prompting, Lavrov mentioned that if Iran is brought into greater engagement with the world, Russia would even welcome the Nabucco pipeline, the cable adds.
The proposed Nabucco would carry natural gas from Erzurum, Turkey, to Baumgarten an der March, Austria. The plan is seen as an attempt to lessen European dependence on Russian energy. The project is backed by several European Union states and the United States and is seen as rival to the Gazprom-led South Stream pipeline project.
(Scroll down to read cable as published by Aftenposten.)
Brazil rejected a Bush administration offer to swap intelligence on Venezuela and its strongman, Hugo Chavez, according to another State Department cable found in the Wikileaks cache. The Brazilians said their relationship with Chavez was touchy. However, they said they would happy to accept whatever intelligence Washington would care to donate.
(Scroll down to read cable as published by Wikileaks.ch.)
Brrr... Kremlin frosts up
over 'Arctic' video game
Video game fanatics face yet one more challenge. The Kremlin is on the look-out for computer games that besmirch Vladimir Putin's regime, a leaked State Department cable reveals.
Putin's hand-picked foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, put the game Naval War: Arctic Circle in the diplomatic cross-hairs, arguing that a private firm, Turbo Tape Games, depicts Russia as the enemy in a conflict over Arctic resources.
Lavrov cited the game in his complaint to Norway Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere that Norway had been unnecessarily escalating tensions over the matter of Arctic resources. Despite the protest at the 2009 meeting, the computer game was released last year.
Lavrov's awareness demonstrated "impressive research" by the Russians well in advance of the game's release to the public, the cable noted in an apparent reference to the Kremlin's reputation for espionage. However, it was unclear whether deep-cover Russian moles were behind the video game caper.
The video game contretemps came to light in a confidential report from the U.S. embassy in Oslo that was leaked to Wikileaks and found its way to Oslo's Aftenposten newspaper.
Lavrov also told Stoere that he was appalled by the security problems in Afghanistan, where Norwegian troops are aiding the NATO-led war, and said Russia was considering offering training and small arms assistance to the Afghan police.
On Iran, Lavrov welcomed U.S. engagement and said that Iran is ready to use its leverage in the region positively, but needs to know what they will receive in return, the cable says. Without prompting, Lavrov mentioned that if Iran is brought into greater engagement with the world, Russia would even welcome the Nabucco pipeline, the cable adds.
The proposed Nabucco would carry natural gas from Erzurum, Turkey, to Baumgarten an der March, Austria. The plan is seen as an attempt to lessen European dependence on Russian energy. The project is backed by several European Union states and the United States and is seen as rival to the Gazprom-led South Stream pipeline project.
(Scroll down to read cable as published by Aftenposten.)
Brazil rejected a Bush administration offer to swap intelligence on Venezuela and its strongman, Hugo Chavez, according to another State Department cable found in the Wikileaks cache. The Brazilians said their relationship with Chavez was touchy. However, they said they would happy to accept whatever intelligence Washington would care to donate.
(Scroll down to read cable as published by Wikileaks.ch.)
*******************************************************************
Commentary
Washington Post slams Wikileaks prosecution
"Such prosecutions are a bad idea. The government has no business indicting someone who is not a spy and who is not legally bound to keep its secrets. Doing so would criminalize the exchange of information and put at risk responsible media organizations that vet and verify material and take seriously the protection of sources and methods when lives or national security are endangered. The Espionage Act is easily abused, as shown by a criminal case that dragged on for years, before being closed last year, of two lobbyists for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee who did nothing more than pass along to colleagues and a reporter information they gleaned from conversations with U.S. officials. The act should be scrapped or tightened, not given new and dangerous life."
The Post editorial sharply rebukes Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the California Democrat who heads the intelligence committee, and Sen. Joseph Lieberman, the Connecticut independent who heads the homeland security committee.
National security 'wolf' criers
The Post editorial sharply rebukes Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the California Democrat who heads the intelligence committee, and Sen. Joseph Lieberman, the Connecticut independent who heads the homeland security committee.
National security 'wolf' criers
Why are the government's national security secrets so widely scorned? Too many cries of "wolf" to excuse coverup of misconduct or political shenanigans by the "connected insiders."
Icelandic authorities subpoened the communications and financial data of Senators Feinstein and Lieberman as part of an investigation into whether Birgitta Jónsdóttir, a member of Iceland's parliament, is the target of a conspiracy to deprive her of rights of free speech and legislative immunity?
Conservative pundits taste own medicine
Conservative pundits taste own medicine
The manufactured hue and cry over the "tone of political discourse" in the aftermath of the Arizona shootings is a transparent ploy by "mainstream" media to bid for control public discourse to promote the ends of powerful interests. The idea is to stifle free speech and press in the name of civility.
Many of the conservative pundits who face having their fiery commentary hosed down are the same commentators who were demanding prosecutions of Wikileaks organizers and even their allies over the exercise of free, if unwelcome, speech and press.
A word on all the pop psychology and sociology being bandied about over the airwaves concerning creating an atmosphere of violence: A psychotic person can't interpret reality properly. Hence, there's no telling what might set him or her off. Also, public figures have always been prone to fixations by disturbed individuals.
Many of the conservative pundits who face having their fiery commentary hosed down are the same commentators who were demanding prosecutions of Wikileaks organizers and even their allies over the exercise of free, if unwelcome, speech and press.
A word on all the pop psychology and sociology being bandied about over the airwaves concerning creating an atmosphere of violence: A psychotic person can't interpret reality properly. Hence, there's no telling what might set him or her off. Also, public figures have always been prone to fixations by disturbed individuals.
****************************************************
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000216
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019 TAGS: PINR, PREL, EINV, RU, NO SUBJECT: LAVROV AND STOERE TRADE TOUGH WORDS OVER NATO, BUSINESS DISPUTE
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission, Kevin M. Johnson for reasons 1.4 b and d
1. (C) Summary: During his March 24-25 Moscow visit FM Stoere clashed with FM Lavrov over the Telenor-Alfa Bank business dispute and NATO issues. On the Arctic Council, Svalbard, Afghanistan, Iran, the Middle East and energy cooperation, discussions were characterized by the normal positive atmosphere between the two ministers. Following the meetings, (TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN) briefed Embassy Oslo, highlighting the GONs wish for U.S. attention to the Arctic and the Secretarys participation in the April 28-29 Arctic Council Ministerial. The GON is concerned that Russia may drift in a more aggressive line and believes U.S. presence at the Arctic Council is necessary to balance this. The GON also seeks a relaunch of a U.S.-Norway High North dialogue. End Summary
Stoere objects to the Shakedown of Telenor ------------------------------------------
2. (C) (TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN) stated that despite their good personal relationship, Stoere and Lavrovs discussions over the Telenor-Alfa Bank business dispute were rough and tense. The GON-owned Telenor (53.9% state ownership) is locked in a heated dispute with the Alfa Group over control of their joint company Vimpelcom (Telenor 30% Alfa 40% share), a Russian mobile phone operator. Telenor has been in the Russian market since 1992 and in partnership with Alfa from 1998. Trouble between the partners began in 2004 over Alfas wish to expand into Ukraine, leading to a series of court cases which have not resolved the issue. Through questionable legal maneuvers conducted by a front company, Alfa won the most recent court case on March 11, resulting in the seizing of Telenors shares in Vimpelcom, currently worth about 1.8 billion dollars (11.8 billion NOK) and their possible forced sale. Under Russian law these shares could be sold before the appeal (currently scheduled for May 26) is heard.
3. (C) Stoere challenged Lavrov to ensure that Telenors shares are not sold before their appeal can be heard. He stressed the damage that Russias economy would suffer if it continues to be unpredictable and arbitrary. The abrupt fall in the Russian stock market on the day the Telenor verdict was announced was proof of this. Lavrov objected to Stoeres statement that the Russian economy was unpredictable and accused Telenor of stopping Russian investment into Ukraine and other former Soviet states in the interest of limiting Russian influence over these areas. Lavrov suggested the TNK-BP model of resolution where BP was forced to cede control and shares to TNK at less than market values, a solution which would not be welcome to the GON.
Real and Imagined Tensions over NATO ------------------------------------ 4. (C) Pointing to the NATO meeting held in Reykjavik in January, the NATO Cold Response exercise held in February-March in Northern Norway, and a Norwegian video game, Lavrov criticized NATO for unnecessarily increasing tensions in the Arctic. Demonstrating impressive research by the Russian Embassy in Oslo, Lavrov objected to the video game Naval War: Arctic Circle, to be released in 2010 by a Norwegian company, Turbo Tape Games (which recently received a substantial grant from the Norwegian Film Institute) and which depicts Russia as the enemy in a conflict over Arctic resources. On the NATO Russia Council Lavrov welcomed new meetings but insisted that they be at the same level as before the Georgian war. He also asked why there have been no discussions on human rights violations in Georgia or NATO shipment of weapons to Georgia.
5. (C) Stoere responded strongly, saying that Norway and NATO have the right to rehearse military maneuvers and that Lavrov should look in the mirror before criticizing NATO military activities in the Arctic, given the substantial increase in Russian military activities in the area. Stoere also urged Russian leaders to make an effort to change Russias image of the enemy and of the West, particularly in the north where bilateral cooperation is strong. Stoere also pressed Lavrov for an explanation on why there has been no substantial progress in the NATO Russia Council.
Less Tension on High North Arctic / Svalbard Issues --------------------------------------------- ------
6. (C) There was only a brief mention of Svalbard, and surprisingly Lavrov did not raise any of Russias standard issues of principle. The ministers discussed Barents cooperation issues, including the implementation of visa-free travel for residents, fishing, the maritime border, and nuclear safety issues. Although agreeing on the importance of the Arctic Council, Stoere and Lavrov discussed their different views of expanding membership, with Russia objecting to a wider membership, particularly the EU.
Energy and Carbon Capture ------------------------- 7. (C) In discussions over development of Shtockman Lavrov maintained that a decision on investment would be taken at the end of this year. He did not believe the financial crisis would impact this decision. Lavrov was also very interested in Stoeres explanation of the GONs carbon capture and storage program. Lavrov complained to Stoere that the European Commission had gone behind his back in making a deal with Ukraine on gas supplies before the Commission-Russia-Ukraine meeting in Brussels the week of March 16. The Norwegian MFA feels that the EU-Russia energy relationship was not good, even claiming that the Russian purposely created traffic and passport problems to ensure that Commissioner Ferroro-Waldner missed her flight during a recent visit to Moscow.
Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East ------------------------------------- 8. (C) Lavrov had just returned from a visit to Afghanistan and was struck by the bad security situation. He said that Russia was considering offering training and small arms assistance to the Afghan police. On Iran, Lavrov welcomed U.S. engagement and stated that Iran is ready to use its leverage in the region positively, but needs to know what they will receive in return. Without prompting, Lavrov mentioned that if Iran is brought into greater engagement with the world, Russia would even welcome the Nabucco pipeline. Lavrov also mentioned Russias intent to host a Middle East meeting in Moscow during the summer, using the Annapolis format.
Will Norway Keep their Russian Rose-Colored Glasses? --------------------------------------------- ------- 9. (C) Comment: The GON is growing more concerned about developments in Russia, although they are careful to continually stress the positive developments in the bilateral relationship. The GON continues to (perhaps wishfully) explain away negative developments in Russia. The latest example was the dismissal of the long-standing governor in Murmansk, after accusations of treason for giving away resources and being too friendly to Scandinavians and Americans. This was characterized as sad, but not an attack on the Norwegian-Russian relationship and was not raised by Stoere in his meetings with Lavrov.
10. (C) It has taken the Telenor business dispute to slightly sharpen Norways criticism of Russia. Despite this serious dispute, the GON wishes to continue good relations with Russia possibly because it does not see any way to effectively counter Russian moves without damaging Norwegian interests. Oil and Energy Minister Riis-Johansens April 22-24 visit to Russia and PM Stoltenbergs May 19 visit to Moscow will show if the GON maintains a positive approach to Russia.
11. (C) Despite the generally rosy outlook, the GON is aware that the potential for trouble with Russia could be rising. The decision to directly brief the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on the Ministers meetings is indicative of the GON wish for the U.S. to counterbalance increased Russia activity in the Arctic. Norway and FM Stoere (helped by the Russians increased activity) have succeeded in raising NATO and U.S. awareness of the Arctic and Barents region but have been struggling to determine what steps they would like to see the U.S. take in the region, beside ratification of the Law of the Sea. In his April 6 meeting with the Secretary, FM Stoere will likely ask for increased dialogue with the U.S. on creative ways to engage in the Arctic and with Russia. Officials from the MFA are scheduled to visit Washington in May to speak with the State Department on a possible restart of the U.S.-Norway High North Dialogue, with a focus on issues such as climate, shipping, energy, Arctic research and resource management. End Comment. WHITNEY
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000715
SIPDIS
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2015
TAGS: PREL BR ETRD MARR FTAA US
REF: A. (A) DANILOVICH-NORIEGA TELCON 14 MARCH 05
¶B. (B) DEPARTMENT WHA/BSC -- EMBASSY E-MAILS 14 MARCH 05 C. (C) STATE 43965 D.
(D) BRASILIA 574 E.
(E) BRASILIA 660
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN J. DANILOVICH. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D).
¶1. (C) Introduction. Ambassador was called for a one-on-one meeting with Foreign Minister Amorim on the afternoon of 14 March. Amorim focused initially on reiterating his strong interest in meeting soon with Secretary Rice, in spite of unsuccessful efforts to schedule a Washington meeting in late March or mid April. (Amorim said he may cancel his April trip to Washington in light of the Secretary's unavailability on 18-19 April, when Amorim had considered combining a call on her with participation at a World Bank meeting on Haiti.) Amorim said that he and President Lula da Silva believe it would be important and highly positive for bilateral relations if the Secretary could visit Brazil soon, and he expressed the hope that she could stop here en route to or from the Community of Democracies summit in Chile in late April. Amorim then noted Ambassador's recent meetings with Deputy Foreign Minister Guimaraes (ref E) and Amorim's chief of Staff Patriota (ref D), and reviewed key issues from those discussions with Ambassador (per below). End introduction VENEZUELA
¶2. (S) Ambassador outlined points (refs A-C) on the USG's growing concern about Chavez's rhetoric and actions, and stressed that the USG increasingly sees Chavez as a threat to the region. Per refs, he asked that FM Amorim consider institutionalizing a more intensive political engagement between the USG and GOB on Chavez, and standing up a dedicated intelligence-sharing arrangement. FM Amorim was clear in his response: "We do not see Chavez as a threat." Amorim said that Chavez has been democratically elected (in a general election that was reaffirmed by a referendum), enjoys substantial domestic support, is a popular figure on the international left and is leader of a major power on the continent. For those reasons, "we have to work with him and do not want to do anything that would jeopardize our relationship with him," Amorim affirmed.
¶3. (S) Amorim said the GOB would welcome intensifying its political dialogue with the U.S. on Chavez, but has no interest in intelligence sharing (although Amorim allowed that the GOB would be willing to look at any intelligence we wished to provide unilaterally). Describing Brazil's relationship with Venezuela as "sensitive," Amorim said the GOB needed to take care not to take steps (e.g., intelligence activity with the USG) that could undermine its credibility with Chavez and undercut the GOB's ability to influence him in a more positive direction. Amorim said that he did not want to exaggerate the importance of Brazil's role in curbing Chavez's more extreme behaviors, but in example Amorim noted Brazil's work with the Friends Group (where he said Brazil weathered criticism from various sides to produce a balanced outcome), Lula's recent suggestion to Chavez in a meeting in Uruguay that he tone down his rhetoric, and also told a story of how Lula had personally persuaded Chavez not to go swimming at a Chilean beach where Chavez intended to proclaim to gathered press that he was bathing in a spot which should be Bolivia's coastline on the Pacific. Amorim also noted that the meeting between Presidents Lula, Chavez, Uribe and Zapatero scheduled for 29 March may occur in the Brazilian Amazon frontier town of Santa Helena for a discussion of economic integration (Note: This does not track with information from Lula's foreign affairs staff, who recently told PolCouns that the meeting would focus on counternarcotics and border security issues. End note.)
BOLIVIA
¶4. (S) Segueing into a discussion of Bolivia, Amorim said that Lula had been in direct contact with opposition leader Evo Morales in recent days. Lula and the GOB are trying to persuade Morales that he needs to act in a democratic fashion, Amorim said, noting that, as with Chavez, it must be understood that Morales has "political legitimacy," with popular support among a significant percentage of Bolivia's population. The USG, Brazil and others need to "take a steady and balanced approach" in supporting democracy in Bolivia in the next crucial weeks, Amorim added. The economic exposure of Brazilian companies in Bolivia, along with the threat posed to regional stability by unrest there, make developments in Bolivia of vital interest to Brazil, Amorim said.
HAITI 5. (SBU) Affirming the USG's support and gratitude for Brazil's leadership in the Haiti mission, Ambassador provided ref A invitation for Brazil to meet with the U.S. and Canada at the assistant secretary level, along with UN senior representative Valdes in Port-au-Prince in coming weeks to discuss cooperation in assistance projects and enhancing political dialogue. Amorim immediately agreed, and said he would designate a representative asap (Note: On the margins of the meeting with Amorim PolCouns spoke briefly with Ambassador Eduardo Felicio, the ministry's lead officer on political issues in the Haiti mission. Felicio indicated that either he or a senior GOB development official would likely represent Brazil at the proposed meeting. End note.) Amorim took the opportunity to affirm to Ambassador in strong terms that the GOB "has no intention of downgrading its commitment to Haiti; on the contrary, we plan to bolster our presence."
SOUTH AMERICA-ARAB SUMMIT
¶6. (C) Amorim told Ambassador that the GOB intended to do all it could to produce a balanced summit statement that would use language of existing UNSC resolutions for any passages dealing with political issues. Amorim also noted that in his meetings with Syria's foreign minister and President Assad in Damascus, Amorim had urged Syrian compliance with UNSCR 1559 (even though Brazil abstained on that vote). Amorim claimed that, even before Syria publicly announced its pull-back in Lebanon, Assad had told Amorim in their meeting that he intended to withdraw Syrian forces from Lebanon, although Amorim said he did not claim to take credit for Assad's decision. Ambassador chided Amorim for Brazil's abstention on 1559 and post facto commitment to Lebanese democracy, at which Amorim smiled. Amorim reiterated that his recent Middle East trip had been focused on providing invitations to Arab participants in the summit, that he had no intention of slighting Israel and would be visiting Israel in June.
FTAA
¶7. (SBU) Ambassador expressed disappointment that Brazil had canceled a March meeting of the FTAA co-chairs, but Amorim emphasized that the GOB had sought only a postponement to early April, so that Amorim would have the opportunity to consult with Brazil's negotiator Bahadian and also with Mercosul partners in advance of the co-chairs meeting. He reiterated that Brazil "wants to remain within the Miami framework," even though Brazil sees some recent USG actions as inconsistent with that goal (e.g., the U.S. approach to IPR and possible cross retaliation). Musing that Brazil is "happy enough to say that the negotiations are under an FTAA umbrella," Amorim opined that what is actually happening now is a Mercosul -U.S. bilateral trade negotiation, since the U.S. "has already executed bilateral agreements with everyone else."
INSS/ATLANTA CONSULATE
¶8. (SBU) Amorim understood the two issues: property sales and INSS payments should be delinked. However, he added that if the U.S. can provide general language in an agreement that reflects a U.S. intention to pay past USG debts to Brazil's social security system or some other acknowledgment that accomplishes that purpose, a solution can be reached. He said "it is in your interest for Brazil to have a consulate in Atlanta," reflecting his understanding that the USG is using delay of approval for the new consulate as leverage to press for a solution on the USG property problem. Ambassador noted that this has been a long-standing issue that was an administrative and financial impediment to our diplomatic mission in Brazil, and that the time has come to solve this matter. Amorim seemed good natured and optimistic about resolving the question with some type of appropriate agreement regarding the USG "intention" to deal with its INSS obligations.
TSA/Alcantara SIPDIS
¶9. (SBU) Amorim also said that the GOB is close to being ready to engage with the USG on revision of the 2000 bilateral Technology Safeguards Agreement for participation of U.S. firms in commercial space launches at the Alcantara facility in northern Brazil. Amorim noted two specific issues -- language referring to safeguard agreements of other countries working at Alcantara and USG requirements on prohibiting launches by states accused of supporting terrorism - as areas where the GOB and USG may need to find new common language for the text.
¶10. (S) Comment: Amorim made it very clear that the GOB is not buying into our categorization of Chavez as a significant threat to the region, to be treated accordingly. The GOB sees him as a legitimate, democratically- elected figure (as is also Evo Morales, in the GOB's view) and Brazil is committed to working closely with Chavez, ostensibly to ameliorate his more extreme behavior by involving him in interdependent economic and political relationships. Brazil seems to believe that is the best route to enhancing regional stability. Amorim's flat rejection of intelligence sharing was balanced by his willingness to engage more intensely with us on a political level in approaching Venezuela, and we should look for ways to exploit that opening in making our case that Chavez represents a danger. Providing the GOB with more detailed information on human rights violations and repressive actions within Venezuela, as well as any information we can share about Chavez-backed mischief in other countries (even if that means offering intelligence unilaterally) can be part of the political engagement. On a more positive note, Amorim was forward-leaning on the two key bilateral issues discussed -- INSS/U.S. property and the Alcantara TSA -- and seems committed to working on resolutions in the near future.
Danilovich
--
Best regards,
Paul Conant
http://veilside78.blogspot.com/2010/12/anti-censorship-spectrum_23.html
Saturday, January 8, 2011
Wikileaks disclosure
U.S. envoy sees little threat
from China's rough tactics
An increasingly cocky and abrasive China is raising alarms in the international arena, acknowledged a senior U.S. diplomat in a leaked cable that plays down any menace posed by the Communist giant.
Robert Goldberg, deputy chief of the U.S. embassy in Beijing, reported that China's new "global assertiveness" was more bluster than threat, according to a leaked cable, that came from the Wikileaks cache, published by Norway's Aftenposten newspaper.
Robert Goldberg, deputy chief of the U.S. embassy in Beijing, reported that China's new "global assertiveness" was more bluster than threat, according to a leaked cable, that came from the Wikileaks cache, published by Norway's Aftenposten newspaper.
Goldberg entitled his report Stomp around and carry a small stick: China's new 'global assertiveness' raise hackles, but has more form than substance.
Goldberg, who assumed his post in 2009, acknowledged that "numerous third-country diplomats have complained to us that dealing with China has become more difficult in the past
year," adding that "the Europeans have been the most vocal in their criticism."
The Chinese truculence was meant to play to Chinese domestic opinion, Goldberg said, quoting "thoughtful observers."
The British embassy's political counsel said in February 2010 that China´s behavior at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit the previous December had been "truly shocking," Goldberg reported, noting that Chinese officials´ attitude toward delegates had been rude and arrogant to the point that both the British and French embassies had been instructed to complain formally about the treatment their leaders had received from the Chinese, specifically from Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei.
Chinese behavior was losing it friends worldwide, said Goldberg.
Goldberg's counsel that Chinese swagger was mostly bluster comes in the face of the need of many credit-strapped democracies -- from the European Union to the United States -- for infusions of Chinese cash to buy up government debt.
The Chinese have been active in gaining strong economic and political footholds in Africa and elsewhere and are increasingly seen by east Asian neighbors as a burgeoning military threat. The United States at one point warned the Chinese about their satellite-killer tests, which underscored the vulnerability of U.S. military technology, being highly integrated with satellite surveillance and communications.
In another leaked cable, President Bush's ambassador to South Korea, Kathleen Stephens, wrote that Chinese officials foresaw the North Korean communist regime as collapsing within two or three years of the death of the iron-fisted leader Kim Jong-Il.
Stephens said a Chinese official acknowledged her point that a strong South Korea-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul's control. The official asserted that, even though "Japan's preference" was to keep Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop reunification in the event North Korea collapses, she said.
Cables follow:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 000383
The Chinese truculence was meant to play to Chinese domestic opinion, Goldberg said, quoting "thoughtful observers."
The British embassy's political counsel said in February 2010 that China´s behavior at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit the previous December had been "truly shocking," Goldberg reported, noting that Chinese officials´ attitude toward delegates had been rude and arrogant to the point that both the British and French embassies had been instructed to complain formally about the treatment their leaders had received from the Chinese, specifically from Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei.
Chinese behavior was losing it friends worldwide, said Goldberg.
Goldberg's counsel that Chinese swagger was mostly bluster comes in the face of the need of many credit-strapped democracies -- from the European Union to the United States -- for infusions of Chinese cash to buy up government debt.
The Chinese have been active in gaining strong economic and political footholds in Africa and elsewhere and are increasingly seen by east Asian neighbors as a burgeoning military threat. The United States at one point warned the Chinese about their satellite-killer tests, which underscored the vulnerability of U.S. military technology, being highly integrated with satellite surveillance and communications.
In another leaked cable, President Bush's ambassador to South Korea, Kathleen Stephens, wrote that Chinese officials foresaw the North Korean communist regime as collapsing within two or three years of the death of the iron-fisted leader Kim Jong-Il.
Stephens said a Chinese official acknowledged her point that a strong South Korea-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul's control. The official asserted that, even though "Japan's preference" was to keep Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop reunification in the event North Korea collapses, she said.
Cables follow:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 000383
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2030
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MASS, MARR, TW, CHINA, EUN
SUBJECT: STOMP AROUND AND CARRY A SMALL STICK: CHINA´S NEW
"GLOBAL ASSERTIVENESS" RAISES HACKLES, BUT HAS MORE FORM
THAN SUBSTANCE
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Goldberg.
Reasons 1.4 B and D.
1. (C) Summary: The harsh (per usual) PRC reaction to the
recent U.S. announcement of arms sales to Taiwan and
President Obama´s intention to meet with the Dalai Lama has
focused Chinese domestic attention on a phenomenon already
observed (and criticized) abroad: China´s muscle-flexing,
triumphalism and assertiveness in its diplomacy. Foreign
diplomats note that China is making no friends with its newly
pugnacious attitude, but the popular assessment of China´s
stance, personified by the nationalistic, jingoistic and
Chinese Communist Party-affiliated newspaper Global Times
(Huanqiu Shibao), is "it´s about time." More thoughtful
observers in China argue that this attitude has more form
than substance and is designed to play to Chinese public
opinion. They are disturbed by this trend and say that Vice
Premier Li Keqiang´s speech in Davos January 28 should be
seen as evidence that China´s leadership is looking to soften
China´s perceived sharp elbows. One senior media contact
advised that foreign observers should not take Chinese
rhetorical strutting too seriously, as "actions speak louder
than words." End summary.
Aggressive Chinese Diplomacy: Losing Friends Worldwide
------------------------------
2. (C) Numerous third-country diplomats have complained to us
that dealing with China has become more difficult in the past
year. The Europeans have been the most vocal in their
criticism. xxxx, EU Mission xxxx in Beijing, said EU leaders had not been happy that
at the November 2009 PRC-EU Summit, Premier Wen Jiabao had
stated that China "expected" the EU to lift its arms embargo
before the next summit. UK Embassy PolCouns xxxx
said February 4 that China´s behavior at the Copenhagen
Climate Change Summit in December had been "truly shocking"
and that Chinese officials´ attitude toward other delegations
had been rude and arrogant to the point where both the UK and
French Embassies had been instructed to complain formally
about the treatment their leaders had received from the
Chinese, specifically from Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei.
Wilson noted that the MFA had not been receptive to these
demarches and neither the UK nor France had received a
response.
3. (C) Indian and Japanese ambassadors voiced similar
complaints in recent meetings with the Ambassador. On
January 26, Indian Ambassador S. Jaishankar said India would
like to "coordinate more closely" with the United States in
the face of China´s "more aggressive approach to
international relations." Japanese Ambassador Yuji Miyamoto
said February 2 that Japanese corporations had been
experiencing some of the same difficulties doing business in
China as other international companies had reported. Japan
had noted a degree of "hubris" in China´s attitude, he said.
4. (C) Japanese xxxx told PolOff
February 5 that Japan was frustrated with Chinese
"inflexibility" on issues relating to the East China Sea. On
development of oil and gas fields, where Chinese companies
have already started extraction work, China had agreed to
Japanese participation. However, China was being "very
stubborn" and not following through on its agreements. Even
more worrying, xxxx reported, was the increased
aggressiveness of Chinese "coast guard" and naval units,
which had provoked "many dangerous encounters" with Japanese
civilian and Self-Defense Force ships. "We have not reported
all of these encounters," xxxx admitted.
5. (C) xxxx added that Japan had heard similar complaints
from its embassies in Southeast Asia about China´s behavior
on South China Sea issues. He said his Indonesian and
Singaporean colleagues in Beijing had referred to PRC policy
in the South China Sea as "more aggressive and arrogant."
The Japanese Embassy in Bangkok reported that in spring 2009
before the Pattaya ASEAN-plus-3 Summit (later rescheduled and
moved to a different location) the Chinese had been
"aggressive and difficult" on logistics and protocol issues,
alienating the other participants. "On the surface, and in
front of cameras, the Chinese are friendly. But underneath,
they are putting huge pressure on Southeast Asian countries
and trying to divide them," xxxx said.
BEIJING 00000383 002 OF 004
6. (C) The PRC had been increasingly assertive in its
interactions with Indonesia in recent years, but there had
not been any recent spike in diplomatic pressure, Indonesian
Embassy xxxx told
PolOffs February 8. xxxx noted past PRC objections to
proposed visits of the Dalai Lama and the transit of Taiwan
President Chen Shui-bian as well as the PRC´s strong reaction
to the June 2009 arrest of Chinese fishermen in Indonesia´s
EEZ. During the July 2009 visit of Foreign Minister Hassan
Wirajuda, PRC officials had insisted that the sailors had
been fishing in "historical fishing grounds" and had
reiterated extensive PRC claims in the South China Sea by
declaring to the Indonesians: "We have a border." Most
recently, however, xxxx said, relations had been better
in the run-up to State Councilor Dai Bingguo´s January 2010
visit to Indonesia.
7. (C) Norwegian Embassy xxxx told
PolOff February 9 that Oslo was unhappy with the trend of its
relations with China. Norway was proud of its human rights
dialogue with China, but there had been no results in 2009
and China had downgraded its representation at the December
2009 round from Vice Foreign Minister to Deputy Director
General. Though the Chinese had taken pains to call the
downgrade "not precedent-setting," Oslo had been
disappointed, and that disappointment had been compounded
when the Chinese sentenced democracy activist Liu Xiaobo to
11 years in prison December 25. Liu had studied in Oslo in
the 1990s and so had a "direct connection to Norway," xxxx
explained.
Domestic Criticism and a Change of Course
------------------------------
8. (C) Not all Chinese foreign policy experts are comfortable
with the new PRC approach. xxxx, xxxx at Beijing News (Xinjing Bao), told PolOff
February 3 that "China´s more aggressive defense of its
interests abroad is new; this is a change in how China
presents itself abroad." He acknowledged that this stance
was popular with the Chinese public, but wondered aloud
whether the policy had been "thought through completely." He
worried that Chinese people would be disappointed if China´s
more aggressive stance backfired and caused China to lose
face. He compared China´s aggressive treatment of foreign
concerns, such as the decision to execute British citizen
Ahmed Sheikh in December despite public appeals for clemency
from UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, with the public praise
the Chinese government had given the Chinese navy in 2009.
"When China could not take any action against U.S. "spy
ships" (in the USNS Impeccable incident in March 2009) and
newspapers showed Chinese fishing boats arrayed against the
U.S. Navy, Chinese people had questioned where was their
navy, and they were disappointed." If China were to
experience diplomatic setbacks, xxxx argued, the people would
again feel that the government had overstated its strength
relative to other states and exposed China to humiliation.
For this reason, he said, China was changing its diplomatic
tune and re-focusing on Hu Jintao´s "harmonious world"
concept. For evidence, he pointed to Vice Premier Li
Keqiang´s January 28 Davos speech which he said demonstrated
a consensus Chinese leadership position that China should
play a more cooperative role in international institutions
and emphasized China´s support for the existing system.
9. (C) (NOTE: Vice Premier Li Keqiang, who is slated to take
over one of China´s leadership positions in 2012-13, gave a
speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos January 28 that
stressed the importance of collaborative efforts to solve
global problems, emphasized twice that "we are in the same
boat" (the same metaphor the Secretary used in her public
remarks in Beijing in February 2009), and reiterated that
China relied on a stable international situation so that it
could concentrate on its own internal development challenges.
Though there were a couple of digs at the United States,
such as a call for "a suitable degree of responsibility and
constraint on global reserve currency issuers," the criticism
was subtle compared to Chinese public statements in other
international forums, such as the EU Summit.)
10. (C) xxxx at the Institute of
American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
was withering in her criticism of populist/nationalistic
media that exaggerated China´s strength and influence in the
world. Specifically citing the Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao,
Chinese edition), she told PolOff February 3 that the media
was "deliberately misleading the public to sell more
newspapers." She said that the Global Times and similar
publications were guilty of "ultra-nationalism" and
"overstating Chinese capabilities." The "powerful China"
theme, she said, was dangerous and wrong. "These newspapers,
and the people, need to sober up a bit and realize the
reality of China´s position. China and the West are not on
the same level, and we are not in the same stage of
development." This inequality made China´s relations with
the West very complicated, she said, and simplistic
nationalism in the press made it very hard for China to show
the necessary flexibility and creativity in its foreign
affairs.
11. (C) In a February 9 discussion with PolOff, Beijing
University xxxx defended the Global Times´ more
"hawkish" editorial slant as "consistent with the demands of
the readers and normal for a market-driven newspaper." He
agreed that China´s leaders wanted to refocus on the "biding
one´s time and concealing one´s capability" (taoguang
yanghui) policy, even though it was not popular with the
Chinese public. xxxx said he had heard in a February 8 Global
Times internal editorial meeting (which he attended as a
frequent contributor to the op-ed pages) that Vice Premier Li
had not wanted to make the Davos speech because he had felt
it would be seen by Chinese audiences as insufficiently
muscular. President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao,
however, had insisted that he do it because of his role as "a
leading figure on the economy." (NOTE: "Biding one´s time
and hiding one´s capabilities" (taoguang yanghui) is a phrase
attributed to former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping that
suggests China should go along with the global status quo
while developing its society and economy.)
12. (C) xxxx added that the text of Foreign Minister Yang
Jiechi´s speech at the Munich Security Conference February 5
had been "totally uninteresting" and had been designed to be
indistinguishable from the Li Keqiang speech. However, he
said, according to a People´s Daily reporter who had been
there (and who was also at the February 8 Global Times
editorial meeting), Yang had been "flustered" by Taiwan arms
sale-related questions during the Q-and-A session and
reverted to his "strong China" message, which became the
basis for Western media reports of his "blunt" remarks. "He
was not supposed to say that," xxxx asserted.
Public, Global Times, Love the New China
------------------------------
13. (C) xxxx of the Global Times´
English-language edition and a former reporter and editor of
People´s Daily, told PolOff February 9 that Chinese people
were increasingly seeking to express opinions to the
government on foreign affairs, and their primary outlets were
online and through the media, which "reflects popular
opinion." He acknowledged that the government and the
Communist Party influenced what got reported in the Chinese
press, but claimed the pressure was not heavy-handed.
"Instead of telling us what to say, they instead guide us by
saying ´more of this´ or ´less of that,´" xxxx said. He
drew a distinction between papers of record, such as People´s
Daily, which existed to promulgate the Party´s position on
issues, and "market-driven" media like Global Times, which
"must reflect public opinion to make money." Global Times,
he said, listened to its readers and therefore advocated an
editorial line that "demands international respect" for
China. China´s foreign policy tilted toward assertiveness in
2009, xxxx acknowledged, but he cautioned that this "new
trend" might not continue. "Biding our time and hiding our
capabilities" was not satisfying to the Chinese public (or
the People´s Liberation Army), xxxx said, but the government
felt it necessary to achieve China´s domestic goals.
14. (C) Global Times xxxx told
PDOff February 9 that the paper was willing to publish
different views and was actively seeking opportunities to
interview U.S. government officials. xxxx felt the current
strong Chinese rhetoric was in reaction to netizen anger at
U.S. arms sales, but that Global Times could present both
sides. The paper´s Chinese- and English-language editions
ran an opinion piece by the Ambassador February 11 noting the
importance of U.S.-China relations and explaining how U.S.
arms sales to Taiwan have maintained stability across the
Strait (creating a better, stronger and more confident
cross-Strait dynamic) for the past 30 years.
15. (C) Professor xxxx of the Central Party School´s
Institute for International Strategic Studies acknowledged
that the editorial line of Global Times made it very popular
among common people and leaders. "I read Global Times every
day," he told PolOff February 3. In this respect, Global
Times appears to sometimes outshine its parent organization,
the flagship newspaper of the Communist Party, People´s
Daily. When asked February 3 about a nuanced, full-page
analysis of U.S.-China relations published January 19 in
People´s Daily that called for restraint in addressing the
"inevitable" bilateral frictions in the relationship that
would come up in 2010, four of Beijing´s top experts in
U.S.-China affairs (including Professor xxxx and the
ubiquitous commentator xxxx of Renmin University)
confessed they were unaware of it.
Watch China´s Actions, Not Words
------------------------------
16. (C) Global Times xxxx advised PolOff "not to
be concerned" about the aggressive tone in China´s
interaction with the West, including in recent commentary
about the U.S.-China relationship. The Chinese government
had a clear vision of China´s interests, xxxx said, and it
was most important to maintain a "favorable foreign policy
environment" for the government to pursue pressing economic
and social development goals at home. A good relationship
with the United States was essential, a view he had heard
recently expressed by Chinese officials. China´s statements
criticizing the United States on the Google case, Internet
freedom, Taiwan arms sales and the President´s planned
meeting with the Dalai Lama were all "necessary to satisfy
the Chinese people," but China´s actions in 2010 would be
aimed at preserving China´s relationships with the rest of
the world. Quoting a Chinese phrase used to describe Deng
Xiaoping´s strategy for mollifying ideological Communists
with socialist rhetoric while pursuing capitalist economic
reforms, xxxx said we should expect China in its 2010
foreign policy to "put on the left turn signal in order to
turn right."
HUNTSMAN
S E C R E T SEOUL 000272
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2034
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KNNP, ECON, SOCI, KS, KN, JA, CH
SUBJECT: VFM CHUN YOUNG-WOO ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS
Classified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary -------
1. (S) Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo told the Ambassador February 17th that China would not be able to stop North Koreas collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically and would collapse politically two to three years after the death of Kim Jong-il. Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the Norths economy. Beijing had "no will" to use its modest economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyangs policies -- and the DPRK leadership "knows it." It was "a very bad thing" that Wu Dawei -- whom Chun characterized as "the most incompetent official in China" -- had retained his position as chief of the PRCs 6PT delegation. Describing a generational difference in Chinese attitudes toward North Korea, Chun claimed Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai and another senior PRC official from the younger generation both believed Korea should be unified under ROK control. Chun acknowledged the Ambassadors point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula. End summary.
VFM Chun on Sino-North Korean Relations... ------------------------------
2. (S) During a February 17 lunch hosted by Ambassador Stephens that covered other topics (septel), ROK Vice Foreign Minister and former ROK Six-Party Talks (6PT) Head of Delegation Chun Yung-woo predicted that China would not be able to stop North Koreas collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically; following the death of KJI, North Korea would collapse politically in "two to three years." Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the Norths economy; there was "no substance" to the reports, he said. The VFM also ridiculed the Chinese foreign ministrys "briefing" to the ROK embassy in Beijing on Wang Jiaruis visit to North Korea; the unidentified briefer had "basically read a Xinhua press release," Chun groused, adding that the PRC interlocutor had been unwilling to answer simple questions like whether Wang had flown to Hamhung or taken a train there to meet KJI.
3. (S) The VFM commented that China had far less influence on North Korea "than most people believe." Beijing had "no will" to use its economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyangs policies and the DPRK leadership "knows it." Chun acknowledged that the Chinese genuinely wanted a denuclearized North Korea, but the PRC was also content with the status quo. Unless China pushed North Korea to the "brink of collapse," the DPRK would likely continue to refuse to take meaningful steps on denuclearization.
...Chinas "Most Incompetent" Official... ------------------------------
4. (S) Turning to the Six Party Talks, Chun said it was "a very bad thing" that Wu Dawei had retained his position as chief of the PRCs delegation. It had been the ROKs expectation that Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai, who was hastily transferred from Tokyo back to Beijing, would be taking over from Wu. Chun said it appeared that the DPRK "must have lobbied extremely hard" for the now-retired Wu to stay on as Chinas 6PT chief. The VFM complained that Wu is the PRCs "most incompetent official," an arrogant, Marx-spouting former Red Guard who "knows nothing about North Korea, nothing about nonproliferation and is hard to communicate with because he doesnt speak English." Wu was also a hardline nationalist, loudly proclaiming -- to anyone willing to listen -- that the PRCs economic rise represented a "return to normalcy" with China as a great world power.
...Chinas "New Generation" of Korea-Hands... ------------------------------
5. (S) Sophisticated Chinese officials like Cui Tiankai and Chinese Communist Party Central Committee International Department Vice Director Liu Jieyi stood in sharp contrast to Wu, according to VFM Chun. Citing private conversations during previous sessions of the Six Party Talks, Chun claimed Cui and Liu both believed Korea should be unified under ROK control. The two officials, Chun said, were ready to "face the new reality" that the DPRK now had little value to China as a buffer state -- a view that since North Koreas 2006 nuclear test had reportedly gained traction among senior PRC leaders.
...PRC Actions In A DPRK Collapse Scenario... ------------------------------
6. (S) Chun argued that, in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would clearly "not welcome" any U.S. military presence north of the DMZ. Again citing his conversations with Cui Tiankai and Liu Jieyi, Chun said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anchored to the United States in a "benign alliance" -- as long as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and labor-export opportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also help salve PRC concerns about living with a reunified Korea. Chun dismissed the prospect of a possible PRC military intervention in the event of a DPRK collapse, noting that Chinas strategic economic interests now lie with the United States, Japan, and South Korea -- not North Korea. Moreover, Chun argued, bare-knuckle PRC military intervention in a DPRK internal crisis could "strengthen the centrifugal forces in Chinas minority areas."
...and Japan ------------
7. (S) Chun acknowledged the Ambassadors point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seouls control. Chun asserted that, even though "Japans preference" was to keep Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop reunification in the event the DPRK collapses. STEPHENS
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHUL #0062/01 0140940
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 140940Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6708
INFO RUCNKOR/KOREA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000062
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/14/2030
TAGS PHUM, PREL, PGOV, PINR, SOCI, ECON, KN, KS, CH
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY KING'S 1/11 MEETING WITH FM YU
Classified By: Ambassador D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
1. (C) During a January 11 meeting with Special Envoy Robert King, FM Yu downplayed press speculation that a North-South summit is imminent. Yu asserted that Kim Jong-il (KJI) would visit China in late January or early February; the North Korean leader needed both Chinese economic aid and political support to stabilize an 'œincreasingly chaotic' situation at home. An unspecified number of high-ranking North Korean officials had recently defected to the ROK, according to Yu. The foreign minister thanked King for his willingness to press the PRC on the treatment of North Korean refugees. Yu said the ROK would provide 'œsignificant' food aid to the DPRK if Pyongyang asked for it and agreed to monitoring. The ROK also planned to help fund work by NGOs to combat TB and multi-drug-resistant TB in the North, which has spread widely within the DPRK's chronically malnourished population. At a lunch following the meeting, Seoul's point man on DPRK issues, Ambassador Wi Sung-lac, reiterated the FM's call for U.S. help in persuading China to go easier on North Korean refugees. Wi also thanked Ambassador King for his willingness to keep the ROK updated on discussions between the American Red Cross and its DPRK counterpart regarding potential reunions between Korean-Americans and their North Korean kin. End summary.
FM Yu on: Prospects for North-South Summit...
------------------------------
2. (C) During a January 11 meeting with Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues Robert King, Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan downplayed press speculation that a North-South summit is imminent. The ROK was discussing the issue with the DPRK, Yu said, noting that there were two major Blue House preconditions: the nuclear issue had to be on the agenda and the ROK would not pay the North to hold a summit. Yu speculated that it would 'œtake some time' for the North Koreans to 'œdigest' the preconditions.
...Rumors of a KJI Visit to China...
------------------------------
3. (C) Yu asserted that Kim Jong-il (KJI) would visit China in late January or early February. The North Korean leader had visited the PRC twice before in that timeframe, Yu related, adding that KJI needed both Chinese economic aid and political support to stabilize an 'œincreasingly chaotic' situation at home. In particular, FM Yu claimed that the North's botched currency reform had caused 'œbig problems' for the regime and that the power succession from KJI to Kim Jong-eun was 'œnot going smoothly.' Moreover, Yu confided, an unspecified number of high-ranking North Korean officials working overseas had recently defected to the ROK. (Note: Yu emphasized that the defections have not been made public. End note.)
...Pressuring Beijing on Refugees...
------------------------------
4. (C) Yu thanked Ambassador King for stating that he intended to work closely with the ROK on the issue of improving human rights conditions in North Korea. Yu also expressed appreciation for Ambassador King's willingness to engage the Chinese on the issue of North Korean refugees. Yu said he has repeatedly raised the matter with PRC FM Yang, only to get a boilerplate response emphasizing that North Koreans in China are economic migrants. Yu claimed that the number of North Koreans fleeing into China XXXXXXXXXXXX continues to increase; 2,952 North Koreans made it to the ROK in 2009 and more than that are expected in 2010. Yu noted that at least 80 percent of the refugees who come to the South are women, adding that they are often abused by human traffickers. XXXXXXXXXXXX Yu added that he was skeptical that the DPRK would engage in dialogue with the EU about human rights.
...and Humanitarian Assistance to the North
------------------------------
5. (C) Responding to a question from Ambassador King, Yu said the North Korean grain harvest was approximately 4 million metric tons (MMT), which was better than expected but still short of the 4.5 MMT the regime needs to ensure stability. (Note: The official ROKG estimate is that the DPRK harvest was approximately 5 MMT. End note.) Given the North's chronic transportation and storage problems, there would be starvation 'œhere and there' during the spring, Yu lamented. The foreign minister said the ROK would be willing to provide 'œsignificant' food aid to the DPRK if Pyongyang asked for it and agreed to monitoring. The ROK would not, Yu said, simply give the North a huge amount of grain. Any aid would be given in small amounts, he stressed. The foreign minister also said the ROK would help fund work by NGOs to combat multi-drug-resistant TB in the North, which has spread widely within the DPRK's chronically malnourished population.
Follow-On Lunch with XXXXXXXXXXXX
------------------------------
6. (C) At a lunch following the meeting with XXXXXXXXXX reiterated the FM's call for the United States to XXXXXXXXXXXX
7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX thanked Ambassador King for his willingness to keep the ROK updated on discussions between the American Red Cross and its DPRK counterpart regarding potential reunions between Korean-Americans and their relatives in North Korea. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that North Korea has made only token efforts to support North-South family reunions and has 'œreacted badly' to Seoul's repeated calls for the release of the approximately 1,000 abductees and POWs believed to be still held by the DPRK. XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed that Seoul appreciated Ambassador King's effort to keep the family reunion, abductee, and POW issues on the proverbial agenda. STEPHENS
No comments:
Post a Comment