Wednesday, February 23, 2011
Searching the leaked U.S. cables
Here is a handy way of searching the Wikileaks cache of leaked State Department cables:
http://dazzlepod.com/cable/
And there is also the search option provided by Aftenposten:
QADHAFI INC.
This cable was found, for example, on Dazzlepod.
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Here is a handy way of searching the Wikileaks cache of leaked State Department cables:
http://dazzlepod.com/cable/
And there is also the search option provided by Aftenposten:
Søk i Wikileaks-dokumentene
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/wikileaks/
Type in the English keyword (the cables are all in English).QADHAFI INC.
This cable was found, for example, on Dazzlepod.
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R 100926Z MAY 06 FM USLO TRIPOLI TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0829 INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE AMEMBASSY VALLETTA AMEMBASSY ROME DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC USLO TRIPOLI ******************************************************************************** S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000198 DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/PI LONDON FOR TSOU EO 12958 DECL: 4/26/2016 TAGS ECON, ECIN, ETRD, PGOV, LY SUBJECT: QADHAFI INCORPORATED REF: TRIPOLI 33, 53 CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, U.S. Liaison Office, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Qadhafi often speaks out publicly against government corruption, but the politically-connected elite has direct access to lucrative business deals. This commercial access can easily be cut off when individuals fall out of favor. The Qadhafi family and other Jamahiriya political favorites profit from being able to manipulate the multi-layered and regularly shifting dynamics of governance mechanisms in Libya. They have strong interests in the oil and gas sector, telecommunications, infrastructure development, hotels, media distribution, and consumer goods distribution. The financial interests of Qadhafi and his key allies present both opportunites and challenges for reform efforts in Libya. Any reform is likely to be cyclical over the long-term. END SUMMARY --------------------------------------- Saif’s Call For Freedom of the Press Equals Net Profit --------------------------------------- ¶2. (C) As with many other regimes, politically-connected members of the Libyan elite have direct access to lucrative business contracts. Qadhafi often speaks out publicly against government corruption and sometimes dismisses officials who are caught in gross improprieties. In some cases, it appears that falling out of favor politically can trigger the discovery of improprieties in business dealings that might not otherwise come to public attention. As reported reftel, Saif al-Islam’s One-Nine group will reportedly start marketing foreign publications in Libya in the near future. The Qadhafi Foundation, Saif’s quasi-NGO, is hailing the move as an example of freedom and reform in the Jamahiriya. XXXXXXXXXXXX The Qadhafi family will clearly accrue significant financial gains from having exclusive rights to distribute foreign press in Libya, as well as effective censorship over any troubling articles that might appear. The One-Nine group gets it name from the September 1, 1969 anniversary of the Muammar Qadhafi-led military coup that overthrew King Idris. ---------------------------------------- Oil and Gas Revenues Channeled to Qadhafis and Political Elite ------------------------------------------- ¶3. (S) All of the Qadhafi children and favorites are supposed to have income streams from the National Oil Company and oil services subsidiaries. Saif is involved in oil services through One-Nine Petroleum and other Qadhafi family members and associates are believed to have large financial stakes in the Libyan Tamoil oil marketing company based in Europe and Oil Invest. AbdelMagid al-Mansuri, the former “director” of One-Nine Petroleum, was responsible for the ill-executed “U.S.-Libya Economic Forum” held at the Corinthia Hotel December 2004. The Forum was viewed as a blatant attempt to tie up lucrative percentage deals for Libyan elites looking for representative relationships with U.S. companies. During 2004, the internet-based publication Libya al-Yown distributed information tracing a large number of sweetheart deals to One-Nine’s Oil and Gas division XXXXXXXXXXXX in Scotland, home to a well-connected Libyan expatriate community. It is believed that millions of dollars are distributed to politically connected Libyans and Libyan expatriates via the XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX --------------------------------------------- ---- Aisha Competes with Saif on Charitable Activities and Broad Commercial Interests --------------------------------------------- ---- ¶4. (C) Dr. Aisha Muammar Al-Qadhafi, General Secretary of the Wa’atassemo Charity Society, is patron of the December 4-7, 2006 Infrastructure Libya: The International Exhibition and Forum for Libya’s Infrastructure and Economic Development implemented by the UK conference organizer Montgomery and Associates. Also listed as cooperating organizations are the General People’s Committee for Planning, the General Board of Infrastructure and Urban Development, and the Inspector General of Housing and Utilities. At the same time, there will be a U.S.-Libya Oil, Gas and Energy Exhibition and Forum at the same International Fairgrounds, also under Wa’atassemo sponsorship, and coordinated by U.S. company Nathan and Associates. Until recently, Aisha has been in the public eye based on charitable activities, sponsoring human rightsseminars and the situation in Iraq (with a distinct focus on the negative effects of the presence of U.S. and foreign troops), signing up for the international advisory board for Saddam Hussein’s defense strategy, and promoting social welfare for women and children. She now appears to be branching out into areas that will give her more direct connections with the energy and construction sectors, especially since the government has announced that housing development will the major focus of the 2006 budget distributions. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Aisha was actively looking to branch out into other areas, perhaps because of her recent marriage to a Qadhaf al-Dam with additional business interests. Aisha is also reported to have financial interests in the private St. James Clinic of Tripoli, one of the two most trustworthy medical facilities that supplement the unreliable health care available through public facilities. In addition to health care management and referrals to hospitals to Malta and elsewhere in Europe, the clinic has an extensive aesthetic surgery practice. --------------------------------------------- ------ Competition Between Siblings led to Takeover of Coca Cola Plant --------------------------------------------- ------ ¶5. (C) The recent controversy over the Coca Cola plant in Tripoli also highlighted Qadhafi family involvement in commercial enterprise. While three different sons Saadi, Mohammed and Mutassim, were all rumored to be fighting at different points over who had the right to the representative license, the dispute was supposedly argued before the courts and resolved through mediation. The very twisted tale of the Coke franchise, reported in Tripoli 53, continues to confound the local business and diplomatic community attempts to ascertain exactly what interests are in play. One well-connected consumer goods distributor said that Qadhafi’s son Mutassim was involved in setting-up the Coca-Cola franchise held by the Egyptian Ka’Mur group during the late 1990s. XXXXXXXXXXXX Supposedly, Mutassim lost control of many of his personal Libyan business interests during the period of 2001 to 2005 when his brothers took advantage of his absence to put in place their own partnerships. Mutassim was recently spotted by Pol/Econ Chief arriving on a British Air flight at Tripoli International Airport, greeted by a small group of well wishers and protocol assistants with bouquets of flowers, then whisked off to the VIP arrivals lounge and into his vehicles without passing through customs or immigration. Qadhafi son Mohammed heads the Libyan Olympic Committee that now owns 40% of the Libyan Beverage Company, currently the Libyan joint venture Coca-Cola franchisee. The British Ambassador to Libya reported his sources attributed the resolution to a deal whereby Mohammed Al-Qadhafi was prevailed upon to relinquish his/Libyan Olympic Committee’s share of the joint venture and sign it over to the Libyan Pensions Fund. Another Ambassador chimed in that he heard it was sister Aisha Al-Qadhafi who mediated the dispute between the two brothers and got Mohammed out of the soda business. If Libyan government officials are asked about the Coca Cola case, the standard response is that the government was making sure that all the proper licenses and registrations were in place. ---------------------------------------- Telecommunications Controlled by Mohammed ------------------------------------------ ¶6. (S) Mohammed, who has plenty to keep him busy through his control of the General Post and Telecommunications Committee, has major input over any telecomm or internet service. Frequent USLO requests over the last two years to meet with the GPTC have been ignored by the Libyan government, even requests for meetings with senior U.S. officials and Congressional delegations. Several U.S. companies are actively pursuing contracts to provide a much-needed upgrade to the local telecommunications network, but the Libyan government rejects any trade promotion activities for telecom through official government channels. Based on Colonel Qadhafi’s experience overthrowing King Idris and the recognized importance of controlling radio broadcasts in 1969, and the role of mobile phone networking during the 2006 Benghazi riots, the family would definitely want to preserve its strong control over the telecom sector. ------------------------------------ New City Planned by Saadi ------------------------------------- ¶7. (S) Saadi is also branching out into infrastructure development. His functionaries contacted USLO public affairs section for publications in Arabic language on economic and commercial issues. Saadi’s staff then notified USLO that he planned to establish “a new city in the west of the country, in the area between Zwara and the Libyan-Tunisian border. The new city will be under the management and supervision of the Engineer al-Saadi al-Qadhafi.” As Saadi’s staffers frame the interest, “he wants information on how the U.S. can help with this matter.” That general area of coastline has an island that has been slated for tourist development in the last couple years without any subsequent action, perhaps because a large oil processing facility mars the view from the island, and also because outside investors can not get liquor licenses for hotels populated by foreign tourists. The Qadhafi family is already in the tourism business through the large percentage of ownership in the XXXXXXXXXXXX ------------------------------------------- Consumer Goods Distribution Controlled by Few Family Holding Groups ------------------------------------------- ¶8. (C) Food distribution is also reportedly controlled by only four or five politically-connected families. There are no large western-style food markets in Libya. There is small western-style market in Tripoli and some smaller shops in the city that carry more imported items, but most of the neighborhood shops go to the distribution warehouses controlled by the people with strong government ties. The consumer products distribution are largely controlled by three merchants, including the Husni Bey Group, a diversified holding company that runs a range of operations under the direction of Husni Bey’s children. Bey does not characterize his company as politically well-connected, but has learned to expand operations through key alliances and he knows how to work the system to his benefit. More importantly, he knows how to recover when his businesses get caught up in the financial interests of the more connected political elite. The Akida Group, run by the Akak family, is rumored to have close ties to the ruling regime and it runs a virtual monopoly over air conditioning equipment, heating units, and small appliances as the local LG agent. ¶9. (C) The government attempts during the 80s to instigate large socialist-style department stores failed; the shells of the state enterprises sit empty around Tripoli and other Libyan cities. (At least one is rumored to soon be rehabilitated as a modern shopping mall for privately owned stores.) Starting in the mid 90s, people were once again allowed to open small businesses. During Eid holidays, Libyan families buy new clothing to wear during the celebration and treat children to toys and sweets from small stores. The men tend to wear traditional embroidered wool robes produced locally or in Egypt or Syria, while women may indulge in new fashions imported from European or Asian manufacturers. During the January 2006 Eid, local women complained that the clothing variety available in the local shops was limited. Rumors circulating in Tripoli claimed that Qadhafi’s second wife, as well as his daughter Aisha, own or have financial interests in many of the new clothing stores opened in the post-sanctions era. XXXXXXXXXXXX Most of the garments in local stores are imported from China, Malaysia and India. Small boutiques have a limited supply of expensive goods imported from Europe, and these enterprises in particular seem to have the financial backing of people with strong ties to the ruling elite. ------------------------------------------ Qadhafi Incorporated Lifestyle ------------------------------------------ ¶10. (C) Qadhafi himself keeps a low profile in Tripoli. The Bab al-Azizia compound has facilities for banquets and other public events, but it is not lavish in any way compared with the ostentation of the Gulf oil state families or Hariri clan. Qadhafi’s wife travels by chartered jet in Libya, with a motorcade of Mercedes waiting to pick her up at the airport and take her to the destination, but her movements are limited and discrete. She hosted a banquet for diplomatic women in the Bab al-Azizia compound on the occasion of the al-Fatah (Revolution) holiday in September that was festive but not extravagant. Since the family keeps a tight control on the media and most of the Qadhafi children spending excesses take place outside Libya, there is not much public reaction to the coffers of Qadhafi Inc. Compared to egregious pillaging of State coffers elsewhere in Africa, or the lavish spending of Gulf Arabs, the Libyans don’t see much to complain about in their leader’s lifestyle, as long as he does a good job of making sure other people get a piece of the pie. And when Libyans do complain, they are removed from access to financial rewards. ------------- Comment ------------- ¶11. (S) The financial interests of Qadhafi and his key allies present opportunites and challenges for reform efforts in Libya. At a minimum, it seems safe to say that reform will have its ups and downs over the long-term, as individual, regime and national interests come into play. If and when foreign publications do become available in Libya, there will be a financial gain for Saif. At the same time, the family will still have control over monitoring what information is released to the public. Over the long term, demand for more outside information would inevitably create pressure for open access and more press freedom. Similarly, Libya has a stated commitment to moving forward with WTO accession and joining international financial organizations. But it is doing so on its own timetable, a slow timetable. Reported septel, the General People’s Congress just passed in April 2006 new agency and representation rules that run counter to WTO principles. While the General General People’s Committee for Economy and Trade has working groups actively revising legislation to prepare for WTO accession, it will take some time to reconcile all the different structures of the Jamahiriya government (translation: “State of the Masses”). Libyan government officials have been telling P/E Chief for 10 months that the WTO accession will be presented in Geneva “in a few weeks, that only the translation has to be finished.” Institutional development is very primitive and the Libyans have a cultural and social preference for elements of distributive economy, placing great value on financial rewards that flow from affiliation with regime leadership, security services etc. There was a shipment of BMWs delivered to the government in early 2006, for example, and it seems likely that the young men driving them around town got the vehicles “distributed” through their affilation with different government entities. With regard to reform partnership efforts, there are the greatest opportunities to promote positive change by engaging in the Central Bank’s efforts to establish banking controls and standards, partnering with the General People’s Committee for Manpower and Training on civil service reform, and cooperating with the General People’s Committee for Economy and Trade in its WTO accession efforts. BERRY GOLDRICH
Monday, February 14, 2011
Wide-ranging U.S. plan at hand
for energizing Egypt democracy
The United States has a plan, prepared before the Egyptian revolution, that U.S. policymakers and Egyptian activists can draw on to assist Egypt's transition to democracy, a leaked State Department cable shows.
The cable leaves open the possibility that measures begun under the Bush administration, which was calculating that President Hosni Mubarak would soon die or become too infirm to rule, had helped spark the revolution.
Because of the Mubarak regime's continuing interference in U.S. efforts to promote democracy, the State Department decided to draw in resources from outside Egypt to assist in promotion of democratic reforms, the September 2007 cable says. The Mubarak regime had claimed that foreign elements were behind the revolution, though the revolutionaries seem to have been highly self-motivated, even if encouraged by U.S. measures.
The State Department was particularly interested in involving women in the political process, according to the cable, a part of the Wikileaks cache that was published by Norway's Aftenposten newspaper.
The plan included training for bloggers, assistance to human rights lawyers, international coalition building with civil society, and off-shore civic education. Net activists were particularly successful in energizing the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, making some wonder whether U.S. policies helped launch the revolutions. Certainly the State Department's repeated emphasis on internet freedom affected Egypt's ability to use Chinese tactics to forestall successful political networking.
Mubarak is "deeply skeptical of the U.S. role in democracy promotion" but the U.S. programs are "helping to establish democratic institutions and strengthen individual voices for change in Egypt," the cable reads. "This change is often incremental and painstaking, but will also have enduring impact. We will sustain successful programs and create additional on-shore initiatives to optimize American influence through the looming leadership succession."
The plan also calls for wide-ranging changes in the criminal justice system. Curiously, the CIA had, under the Bush administration, transported terror suspects to Egypt, where they were subjected to torture by the security-intelligence apparatus run by Mubarak's right-hand man, Omar Sulieman, who took over as vice president but whose exact status is now unknown.
Attacks on corruption and promotion of labor organizations are also part of the plan.
U.S.-backed institutions included:
# International Republican Institute. Workshops, strategic planning, and capacity building to assist in developing emerging leaders in all political parties. Focus is on current and emerging party leadership and reform-minded non-government organizations in preparation for elections.
# National Democratic Institute. Train municipal candidates and campaign managers -- with an emphasis on women -- in advance of municipal elections, including a mix of in-country consultations and offshore training and exchanges. Build capacity of civil society organizations in election and governance monitoring, networking, and information sharing with counterparts.
# Freedom House. Fund off-shore human rights activities that may include training for bloggers, assistance to human rights lawyers, international coalition building with civil society, and off-shore civic education.
# IFES (formerly International Foundation for Election Systems). Work with reform-minded Egyptian non-government organizations and civic leaders to promote electoral reform and increase voter awareness, education, and registration, particularly among women and youth. Offshore and onshore programming will be included to increase knowledge of international standards for free, fair, and transparent elections; media regulation, and election administration. Technical assistance and training will be offered to the Supreme Elections Commission leading up to the 2008 municipal elections.
However, Egyptian elections held after the plan was drawn up were widely viewed as shams.
Other State Department initiatives include:
# A conference on the role of Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, in democratic politics.
# Expanding training of domestic and international election monitors. This could include work with the Ibn Khaldun Center and others.
# Training civil society and think tanks in public opinion polling.
# Strengthening advocacy skills of civil society and promoting exchanges, especially those focused on coalition building, youth and women.
# Supporting programs aimed at advocacy for women,s rights and expanding the capacity of individuals and groups seeking to safeguard women's rights and increase their political participation.
# Providing onshore and offshore support and training for indigenous human rights efforts, including those focused on minorities, religious freedom, freedom speech, and youth.
# Providing training for independent media, internet-centered media, and increased public diplomacy.
The cable, as found at Aftenposten, follows:
09.10.2007: EGYPT: UPDATED DEMOCRACY STRATEGY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 003001
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC STAFF FOR WATERS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KDEM, KMPI, EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT: UPDATED DEMOCRACY STRATEGY
REF: STATE 130991
Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
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Summary
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1. (C) Our fundamental reform goal in Egypt remains democratic transformation, including the expansion of political freedom and democratic pluralism, respect for human rights, and a stable, democratic and legitimate transition to the post-Mubarak era. While our programs in the areas of judicial reform and decentralization are well-conceived and have had some notable successes, we propose to expand our support for civil society, especially through offshore programming. During the spring of 2007, Embassy Cairo, coordinating closely with Washington colleagues via shared draft papers and secure DVC discussions, drafted the following document which currently serves as the basis for our democracy promotion efforts in Egypt. End summary.
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Total Proposed Democracy and Governance Spending FY 2008 and 2009
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2. (SBU) The total proposed D and G spending for FY2008 will be USD 65-75 million with USD 11-13 million for off-shore programming and USD 54-62 million for ongoing and new on-shore programming. Total spending for FY2009 will be USD 75 million with USD 25 million for off-shore programming and USD 50 million for ongoing and new on-shore programming.
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Off-Shore Programming
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3. (C) Due to on-going GOE interference with U.S. democracy and human rights assistance programs, the Deputies Committee decided on April 10 to proceed with offshore programming as appropriate. Per this guidance, the interagency agreed to release USD 5 million in FY2007, USD 11-13 million in FY2008, and USD 25 million in FY2009. State will determine the administration of the programming funds. Decisions will be project-driven with a focus on competitive grants and low administrative overhead.
4. (SBU) FY2007: USD 5 million, to include support of:
(a) International Republican Institute (IRI): Workshops, strategic planning, and capacity building to assist in developing emerging leaders in all political parties. Focus is on current and emerging party leadership and reform-minded NGOs in preparation for the 2010 parliamentary elections and 2011 presidential election.
(b) National Democratic Institute (NDI): Train municipal candidates and campaign managers (with an emphasis on women) in advance of 2008 municipal elections, including a mix of in-country consultations and offshore training and exchanges. Build capacity of civil society organizations in election and governance monitoring, networking, and information sharing with counterparts.
(c) Freedom House: Fund off-shore human rights activities that may include training for bloggers, assistance to human rights lawyers, international coalition building with civil society, and off-shore civic education.
(d) IFES (formerly International Foundation for Election Systems): Work with reform-minded Egyptian NGOs and civic leaders to promote electoral reform and increase voter awareness, education, and registration, particularly among women and youth. Offshore and onshore programming will be included to increase knowledge of international standards for free, fair, and transparent elections; media regulation, and election administration. Technical assistance and training will be offered to the Supreme Elections Commission leading up to the 2008 municipal elections.
5. (SBU) FY 2008: USD 11-13 million: The above programs will continue and new programs will be added to include the following:
(a) MEPI-funded conference on the role of Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, in democratic politics: Meridian House to organize a conference for American academics and policy makers
(b) Expanding training of domestic and international election monitors. This could include work with the Ibn Khaldun Center and others.
(c) Training civil society and think tanks in public opinion polling.
(d) Strengthening advocacy skills of civil society and promoting exchanges, especially those focused on coalition building, youth and women, including small grants to be administered by the implementing NGO.
(e) Supporting programs aimed at advocacy for women,s rights and expanding the capacity of individuals and groups seeking to safeguard women,s rights and increase their political participation. This would also include a focus on trafficking in person.
(f) Providing onshore and offshore support and training for indigenous human rights efforts, including those focused on minorities, religious freedom, freedom speech, and youth.
(g) Providing training for independent media, internet-centered media, and increased public diplomacy.
6. (SBU) FY 2009: USD 25 million: Expanding the above programs and adding new programs to adapt to the new political environment, including efforts to prepare for the 2010 parliamentary elections and the 2011 presidential election.
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Breakdown of Ongoing and New On-Shore Programming: FY2008 and FY2009
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7. (C) President Mubarak is deeply skeptical of the U.S. role in democracy promotion. Nonetheless, USG programs are helping to establish democratic institutions and strengthen individual voices for change in Egypt. This change is often incremental and painstaking, but will also have enduring impact. We will sustain successful programs and create additional on-shore initiatives to optimize American influence through the looming leadership succession.
8. (SBU) Total funding for ongoing and new on-shore programming will be between USD 54-62 million for FY2008 with USD 28.5-31.5 million for in-country activities working with the GOE and USD 25.5-30.5 million for other in-country activities and USAID direct grants. Total funding in FY2009 is set at USD 50 million with USD 27 million for in-country activities working with the GOE and USD 23 million for other in-country activities and USAID direct grants.
9. (SBU) Proposed list of programs for in-country activities working with the GOE:
(a) Administration of Justice Support Project II: Improve the effectiveness of civil/commercial courts, streamline court procedures and enhance transparency.
(b) Family Justice: Strengthen the capacity of family justice system to mediate family disputes and increase access to family legal services.
(c) Criminal Justice: Provide more effective assistance of counsel to defendants through a public defense system and human rights training for prosecutors/judges.
(d) Constitutional Court: Enhance the role of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court in judicial ethics, child abduction, and environmental law by deepening the legal knowledge and skills of members and increasing interaction with peers.
(e) Court of Cassation: Work with the court to make its rulings accessible, particularly to lower court judges.
(f) Parliament: Technical assistance and training to members and staff to strengthen their role in developing and implementing a reform agenda, improve representation, and strengthen skills as checks on the executive branch.
(g) Anti-Corruption/Public Accountability: Increase transparency in government operations and increase citizen demand for public accountability through a transparent budget, and transparency legislation, policies and conventions promoting public accountability.
(h) Decentralization: Develop a national policy and localpractices to decentralize selected financial, political and administrative authorities to regional and local governments to strengthen citizen participation and improve service delivery.
(i) Human Rights and National Councils: Strengthen quasi-government human rights councils (National Council for Human Rights, National Council for Women and National Council for Childhood and Motherhood) to protect human rights and combat violence against women and children.
(j) FTA Support: Provide technical assistance to help Egypt move its laws into compliance with requirements under a possible FTA, including workers, rights.
10. (SBU) Proposed list of programs for other in-country activities and USAID direct grant:
(a) USAID Direct Grants: Through grants to Egyptian NGOs, continue to support innovative Egyptian reform initiatives in political and electoral reform, increased political participation, civil society strengthening, civic education, human rights, women,s rights, community development, independent media, and transparency.
(b) Corruption: Support Transparency International and Egyptian NGOs to develop skills to combat corruption and advocate reforms to promote transparency and accountability in government and business.
(c) Labor: Promote freedom of association and reform of Egypt,s state-controlled labor unions through an agreement with the International Labor Organization and the AFL-CIO,s Solidarity Center.
(d) Independent Media: Build training capacity to promote professional development among journalists and managers; improve media management; and foster policy reform leading to the privatization of the print and broadcast sectors.
(e) Women,s Rights: Support Egyptian organizations advocating for women,s political, economic and social rights.
RICCIARDONE
Saturday, January 29, 2011
Egypt's new No. 2 long eyed
as a likely Mubarak succesor
The new vice president of Egypt has long been seen as a likely successor to the country's besieged president, Hosni Mubarak.
Omar Suleiman, the chief of the intelligence service, was among those whom U.S. diplomats viewed as probable successors to Mubarak once he died or became incapacitated, according to a leaked State Department cable obtained by Wikileaks.
However, Mubarak has given no signal that he intends to step down to clear the way for his right-hand man.
In an allusion to American organized crime, the 2007 cable describes Suleiman, who is in his mid seventies, as Mubarak's "consigliere" (Italian for "counselor"), who had often been "cited as likely to be named to the long-vacant vice-presidential post." The cable goes on to describe how the system is rigged as a bar to true democracy.
Suleiman might serve in a transitional role, though his liking for public service is clear, the cable says.
Suleiman's age and status, the cable reads, "could be attractive to the ruling apparatus and the public at large as a reliable figure unlikely to harbor ambitions for another multi-decade presidency."
Even if Mubarak's son, Gamal, were named president, Suleiman would probably have to consent, the cable says. The whereabouts of Gamal, a banker, are unknown. Another Wikileaks cable records a conversation Gamal had with Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman about the global financial crisis. Gamal warned that, if the United States didn't restore order to its banking system, Egypt would eventually feel the brunt of the fiscal crisis.
Gamal Mubarak, according to the cable which was cleared by Lieberman, gave no hint that ordinary Egyptians were already suffering from severe economic problems.
The Lieberman cable can be found at http://wikileaks.ch
The succession cable, as found on Oslo's Aftenposten, follows.
For a group of Wikileaks cables on Egypt, scroll down. Of note is that the leaked U.S. cable on high-level Tunisian corruption preceded the Tunisian revolution, which, however, was fanned by al Jazeera coverage.
C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 001417
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR WATERS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2017
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, EG
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN EGYPT
REF: A. CAIRO 671
B. CAIRO 974
C. 2006 CAIRO 2010
CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR FRANCIS J. RICCIARDONE,
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IS
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM OF EGYPTIAN POLITICS. DESPITE
INCESSANT WHISPERED DISCUSSIONS, NO ONE IN EGYPT HAS ANY
CERTAINTY ABOUT WHO WILL SUCCEED MUBARAK, OR HOW THE
SUCCESSION WILL HAPPEN. MUBARAK HIMSELF SEEMS TO BE TRUSTING
TO GOD AND THE INERTIA OF THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SECURITY
SERVICES TO ENSURE AN ORDERLY TRANSITION. IN THE CURRENT
POLITICAL FRAMEWORK, THE MOST LIKELY CONTENDERS ARE
PRESIDENTIAL SON GAMAL MUBARAK (WHOSE PROFILE IS
EVER-INCREASING AT THE RULING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY),
EGIS CHIEF OMAR SOLIMAN, DARK HORSE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY
GENERAL AMRE MOUSSA, OR AN AS-YET UNKNOWN MILITARY OFFICER.
WHOEVER ENDS UP AS EGYPT´S NEXT PRESIDENT LIKELY WILL BE
POLITICALLY WEAKER THAN MUBARAK. ONCE MUBARAK´S SUCCESSOR
HAS ASSUMED THE POST, HIS FIRST PRIORITY WILL BE TO BUILD
POPULAR SUPPORT. WE THUS EXPECT THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT WILL
LIKELY ADOPT AN ANTI-AMERICAN TONE IN HIS INITIAL PUBLIC
RHETORIC, IN AN EFFORT TO PROVE HIS NATIONALIST BONA FIDES TO
THE EGYPTIAN STREET, AND MAY POSSIBLY EXTEND AN OLIVE BRANCH
TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AS DID PREVIOUS EGYPTIAN
PRESIDENTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR TERMS. END SUMMARY.
------------------------------
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SUCCESSION
------------------------------
2. (C) PRESIDENT MUBARAK IS FOND OF OBSERVING THAT NO ONE
SHOULD HAVE ANY QUALMS REGARDING HIS SUCCESSION, SINCE
EGYPT´S CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A DETAILED GUIDE FOR HOW A
SUCCESSION SHOULD PROCEED. AMONG THE RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS WAS A NOTABLE CHANGE TO THE ARTICLE DETERMINING
WHICH OFFICIAL ASSUMES POWER IN THE EVENT OF THE TEMPORARY
INCAPACITATION OF THE PRESIDENT. ARTICLE 82, WHICH
PREVIOUSLY DELINEATED THAT THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHOULD ASSUME
PRESIDENTIAL POWERS "IF ON ACCOUNT OF ANY TEMPORARY OBSTACLE
THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO CARRY OUT HIS DUTIES," HAS BEEN
AMENDED SO THAT, IF THERE IS NO VICE-PRESIDENT, THE PRIME
MINISTER IS ASSIGNED PRESIDENTIAL POWERS. ARTICLE 84 READS,
"IN CASE OF THE VACANCY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE OR THE
PERMANENT DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT," THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PEOPLE´S ASSEMBLY (PA) OR THE PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT SHOULD TEMPORARILY ASSUME THE
PRESIDENCY. NEITHER WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE ALLOWED TO
NOMINATE HIMSELF FOR THE PRESIDENCY; THERE IS NO SUCH
STIPULATION AGAINST THE PM RUNNING FOR THE OFFICE. ARTICLE
84 GOES ON TO STIPULATE THAT, "THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
SHALL BE CHOSEN WITHIN A MAXIMUM PERIOD OF 60 DAYS FROM THE
DAY OF THE VACANCY OF THE PRESIDENCY."
3. (C) CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 76, WHICH PREVIOUSLY WIRED THE
EGYPTIAN ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK TO GUARANTEE THE PRESIDENCY TO
THE RULING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP), WAS ALSO AMONG
THE ARTICLES AMENDED IN APRIL (REF A). THE CHANGE WILL
OSTENSIBLY FACILITATE MORE COMPETITIVE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS, WHILE STILL PROTECTING AGAINST ANY SERIOUS
CHALLENGE TO THE NDP CANDIDATE. UNDER THE REVISIONS TO
ARTICLE 76, FOR AN INTERIM 10-YEAR PERIOD (I.E. UNTIL 2017),
LEGAL POLITICAL PARTIES WHICH HOLD AN ELECTED SEAT IN THE
PEOPLE´S ASSEMBLY OR SHURA COUNCIL CAN NOMINATE A
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE (CURRENTLY, ONLY FOUR PARTIES MEET
THIS REQUIREMENT - THE NDP, AL GHAD, AL WAFD, AND TAGGAMU).
FOLLOWING THE INTERIM PERIOD, IN ORDER TO RUN A PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATE:
-- A PARTY HAS TO HAVE BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR AT LEAST 5 YEARS
PRIOR TO THE ELECTION;
-- ITS CANDIDATE MUST HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OF THE HIGHEST
LEADERSHIP BODY OF THE PARTY FOR AT LEAST 1 YEAR; AND,
-- THE PARTY WOULD HAVE TO HOLD AT LEAST 3% OF THE SEATS IN
BOTH PARLIAMENTARY HOUSES (I.E., 14 SEATS IN THE PEOPLE´S
ASSEMBLY, AND 6 SEATS IN THE SHURA COUNCIL), OR 6% OF THE
SEATS
IN EITHER THE PA OR SHURA COUNCIL).
4. (C) GENUINELY INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES FACE AN ALMOST
IMPOSSIBLE BAR TO ENTER THE RACE. TO COMPETE IN THE NEXT
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, ARTICLE 76 STATES THAT AN
"INDEPENDENT" MUST OBTAIN ENDORSEMENTS FROM 250 ELECTED
MEMBERS OF EGYPT´S NATIONAL AND LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE BODIES,
OF WHICH THERE MUST BE A MINIMUM OF 65 ENDORSEMENTS FROM
MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY, 25 FROM THE SHURA COUNCIL,
AND 10 FROM LOCAL COUNCILS IN AT LEAST 14 GOVERNORATES. THIS
WOULD BE A NEAR UNATTAINABLE FEAT FOR A NON-NDP CANDIDATE TO
ACHIEVE, GIVEN THE RULING PARTY´S DOMINATION OF ALL EGYPTIAN
ELECTED BODIES. IN EFFECT, THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 76
ACCOMPLISH TWO OBJECTIVES REGARDING INDEPENDENTS: THE RULING
PARTY CAN BLOCK THE EMERGENCE OF ANY GENUINELY "INDEPENDENT"
CANDIDATE, WHILE IT COULD THEORETICALLY REACH BEYOND THE
NDP´S TOP LEADERSHIP TO SELECT AN "INDEPENDENT" WHOM THE
RULING ELITE JUDGES WILL BEST PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS,
PROVIDED THE NDP RETAINS PARTY DISCIPLINE.
--------------------
POTENTIAL CANDIDATES
--------------------
5. (C) PRESIDENT MUBARAK, WHO BEGAN HIS FIFTH 6-YEAR TERM IN
SEPTEMBER 2005, RECENTLY TURNED 79. THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION IS DUE TO BE HELD IN 2011. BY THE TIME MUBARAK
SERVES HIS FULL TERM, THERE MAY BE OTHER CANDIDATES IN THE
WINGS, OR MUBARAK HIMSELF COULD CHOOSE TO RUN AGAIN FOR THE
PRESIDENCY. HE IS ON RECORD AS SAYING, IN A NOVEMBER 2006
SPEECH, THAT HE PLANNED TO REMAIN PRESIDENT "AS LONG AS I
HAVE A HEART THAT BEATS, AND BREATH IN MY BODY." BUT IF THE
SUCCESSION HAPPENED TOMORROW, EGYPTIAN PARLOR SPECULATION
FOCUSES ON THE FOLLOWING AS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS.
GAMAL MUBARAK
-------------
6. (C) CAIRENE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HOLDS THAT GAMAL WANTS THE
JOB, DESPITE HIS REPEATED DENIALS TO THE CONTRARY (REF B).
THE MOST RECENT SUCH ABJURATION WAS ON MAY 2, DURING AN
INTERVIEW WITH THE ORBIT SATELLITE TV CHANNEL, WHEN GAMAL
STATED THAT, "I DO NOT HAVE THE INTENTION AND AMBITION TO RUN
FOR PRESIDENT ... WHATEVER THE PARTY SAYS DOES NOT MATTER. I
AM NOT LOOKING FOR ANY EXECUTIVE POST." SUCH COY DEMURRALS
RING HOLLOW IN THE FACE OF HIS INCREASINGLY ROBUST ROLE
WITHIN THE NDP (FAR EXCEEDING THAT OF HIS COUNTERPARTS IN THE
PARTY HIERARCHY), HIS APPARENTLY CENTRAL ROLE IN CREATING NEW
LEGISLATION, AND HIS RECENT TOURS TO VARIOUS GOVERNORATES
FEATURING MINISTERIAL ENTOURAGES. IT IS HARD TO ARGUE THAT
GAMAL IS NOT BEING GROOMED FOR THE PRESIDENCY.
7. (C) MANY IN THE EGYPTIAN ELITE SEE HIS SUCCESSION AS
POSITIVE, AS HIS LIKELY CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT STATUS
QUO WOULD SERVE THEIR BUSINESS AND POLITICAL INTERESTS.
GIVEN THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CANDIDACY, AND WEAK
OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP, THERE ARE CURRENTLY FEW OTHER EGYPTIAN
PERSONALITIES WITH THE NATIONAL STATURE AND POLITICAL CAPITAL
TO SERIOUSLY CONTEND FOR THE PRESIDENCY. LIKEWISE, DUE TO
THE PARANOIA OF THE EGYPTIAN DICTATORSHIP, NO OTHER NAME CAN
SAFELY OR RESPECTFULLY BE BRUITED AS A CONTENDER. WHILE THE
PRESIDENT´S SON IS VULNERABLE TO OPEN CRITICISM FOR HIS
PRESUMED AMBITION, HE IS THE ONLY PERSON IN EGYPT WHOSE TOTAL
LOYALTY TO MUBARAK IS ALSO TAKEN FOR GRANTED, SO HIS IS THE
ONLY NAME THAT CAN POSSIBLY BE BANDIED ABOUT.
8. (C) A KEY STUMBLING BLOCK FOR A GAMAL CANDIDACY COULD BE
THE MILITARY. EACH OF EGYPT´S FOUR PRESIDENTS SINCE 1952
AROSE FROM THE OFFICER CORPS, AND THE MILITARY HAS
HISTORICALLY BEEN THE ULTIMATE GUARANTOR OF THE PRESIDENT´S
RULE. GAMAL DID NOT SERVE AS A MILITARY OFFICER, AND WE
BELIEVE HE DID NOT COMPLETE HIS COMPULSORY SERVICE. MANY
OBSERVERS OPINE THAT TIMING IS THE CRUCIAL FACTOR FOR A
POTENTIAL GAMAL PRESIDENCY - HIS POWER BASE IS HIS FATHER,
AND SO WHILE HE COULD CONCEIVABLY BE INSTALLED PRIOR TO
MUBARAK´S DEATH, THE TASK WOULD BECOME FAR MORE DIFFICULT,
ALTHOUGH NOT INSURMOUNTABLE, ONCE THE PHARAOH HAS DEPARTED
THE SCENE, AND PERSONAL LOYALTIES TO HIM ARE IN THE PAST.
ALTHOUGH THERE IS WIDESPREAD POPULAR ANIMUS AGAINST A GAMAL
CANDIDACY, WITH MANY EGYPTIANS OPINING PROUDLY THAT, "WE ARE
NOT SYRIA OR SAUDI!", THE NDP MACHINERY COULD LIKELY STAGE AN
ELECTORAL VICTORY, BASED ON POOR VOTER TURNOUT, SLOPPY VOTER
LISTS, AND STATE CONTROL OF THE ELECTION APPARATUS.
OMAR SOLIMAN
-------------
9. (C) EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF AND MUBARAK CONSIGLIERE,
IN PAST YEARS SOLIMAN WAS OFTEN CITED AS LIKELY TO BE NAMED
TO THE LONG-VACANT VICE-PRESIDENTIAL POST. IN THE PAST TWO
YEARS, SOLIMAN HAS STEPPED OUT OF THE SHADOWS, AND ALLOWED
HIMSELF TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED, AND HIS MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN
LEADERS REPORTED. MANY OF OUR CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT SOLIMAN,
BECAUSE OF HIS MILITARY BACKGROUND, WOULD AT THE LEAST HAVE
TO FIGURE IN ANY SUCCESSION SCENARIO FOR GAMAL, POSSIBLY AS A
TRANSITIONAL FIGURE. SOLIMAN HIMSELF ADAMANTLY DENIES ANY
PERSONAL AMBITIONS, BUT HIS INTEREST AND DEDICATION TO
NATIONAL SERVICE IS OBVIOUS. HIS LOYALTY TO MUBARAK SEEMS
ROCK-SOLID. AT AGE 71, HE COULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO THE RULING
APPARATUS AND THE PUBLIC AT LARGE AS A RELIABLE FIGURE
UNLIKELY TO HARBOR AMBITIONS FOR ANOTHER MULTI-DECADE
PRESIDENCY. A KEY UNANSWERED QUESTION IS HOW HE WOULD
RESPOND TO A GAMAL PRESIDENCY ONCE MUBARAK IS DEAD. AN
ALLEGED PERSONAL FRIEND OF SOLIMAN TELLS US THAT SOLIMAN
"DETESTS" THE IDEA OF GAMAL AS PRESIDENT, AND THAT HE ALSO
WAS "DEEPLY PERSONALLY HURT" BY MUBARAK, WHO PROMISED TO NAME
HIM VICE-PRESIDENT SEVERAL YEARS AGO, BUT THEN RENEGED.
AMRE MOUSSA
-----------
10. (C) THE CHARISMATIC ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL
PRUDENTLY HAS NEVER INDICATED INTENTION OR AMBITION TO ENTER
INTO EGYPTS DOMESTIC POLITICAL FRAY, AND HAS NO EGYPTIAN
INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL PLATFORM FROM WHICH TO SPRING.
HOWEVER, AS THE HIGH-PROFILE ELDER STATESMAN OF ARAB CAUSES,
HE ENJOYS CONSIDERABLE STREET CREDIBILITY, POPULARITY, AND
PERCEIVED GRAVITAS. IT IS FAR-FETCHED BUT CONCEIVABLE THAT,
IN A LEADERSHIP CRISIS FOLLOWING MUBARAK´S DEATH, MOUSSA
COULD EMERGE AS A PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDER, PROVIDED THAT HE IS
AN NDP MEMBER, OR IF THE NDP WERE TO PROMOTE HIM UNDER THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ALLOWED FOR INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES.
MILITARY OFFICER
----------------
11. (C) CURRENTLY, THERE IS NO OBVIOUS CONTENDER FROM AMONG
THE OFFICER CORPS, EGYPT´S TRADITIONAL PRESIDENTIAL
RECRUITMENT GROUNDS. MINISTER OF DEFENSE TANTAWI, A
CONTEMPORARY OF MUBARAK´S, APPEARS TO HARBOR NO POLITICAL
AMBITIONS. LIKE SOLIMAN, HE COULD PLAY A ROLE IN CLEARING
THE WAY FOR GAMAL, IF HE CALCULATES THAT IS IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY; CONVERSELY, HE COULD ALSO BE A KEY
PLAYER IN PREVENTING GAMALS ASCENDANCE. WE HAVE HEARD SOME
LIMITED REPORTS OF TANTAWIS INCREASING FRUSTRATION AND
DISENCHANTMENT WITH GAMAL (REF B). IN THE EVENT OF A NATIONAL
LEADERSHIP CRISIS, IT IS NEAR INCONCEIVABLE THAT GIVEN
MUBARAK´S PERSONAL MANIPULATION OF THE OFFICE CORPS, THAT
ANOTHER MILITARY OFFICER COULD EMERGE FROM OBSCURITY TO
ASSERT HIMSELF AS A CANDIDATE. BUT TANTAWI AND HIS SENIOR
COTERIE ARE NOT NECESSARILY POPULAR AT MID AND LOWER RANKS,
SO THE POSSIBILITY OF A MID-20TH CENTURY STYLE COUP OF
COLONELS CANNOT BE ENTIRELY DISCOUNTED.
OPPOSITION MEMBER
-----------------
12. (C) OF THE 10 PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS IN 2005,
SECOND-PLACE AL GHAD PARTY LEADER AYMAN NOUR IS CURRENTLY
SERVING A SEVEN-YEAR JAIL TERM, AND ACCORDING TO EGYPTIAN
LAW, WILL BE BANNED FROM PARTICIPATING IN EGYPTIAN POLITICAL
LIFE FOR SEVERAL YEARS FOLLOWING HIS RELEASE. THE
THIRD-PLACE FINISHER, AL WAFD PARTY CANDIDATE NO´MAN GOMAA,
LOST HIS PARTY POSITION FOLLOWING A VIOLENT AND
SCANDAL-RIDDEN LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE. THE OTHER EIGHT
CANDIDATES, MARGINAL FIGURES TO BEGIN WITH, HAVE FADED BACK
INTO TOTAL OBSCURITY. CURRENT AL WAFD LEADER MAHMOUD ABAZA
IS A TALENTED POLITICIAN, BUT AT THIS POINT, DOES NOT APPEAR
TO HAVE NATIONAL APPEAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY TO MOUNT A
SERIOUS ATTEMPT AT THE PRESIDENCY.
DARK HORSE AND ALSO RANS
------------------------
13. (C) POPULAR REFORMIST MINISTER OF TRADE RACHID IS A
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE, THOUGH A DISTINCT DARK HORSE.
NONETHELESS, HE COMES FROM AN OLD AND RESPECTED FAMILY AND IS
SEEN BY MANY AS LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR EGYPT´S IMPRESSIVE
ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE PAST THREE YEARS. INTERESTINGLY, THE
HEAD OF CAIRO´S LARGE AND INFLUENTIAL AMCHAM, WHO KNOWS
RACHID WELL, TOLD US THAT, AFTER NEGOTIATING THE
CONTROVERSIAL QIZ PROGRAM, THE MINISTER "REALLY NEEDS
MOVEMENT ON THE FTA FOR POLITICAL COVER," RAISING THE
QUESTION: POLITICAL COVER FOR WHAT? WHILE IT IS HIGHLY
UNLIKELY RACHID WOULD TAKE ON GAMAL HEAD-TO-HEAD, WE CANNOT
DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WILLPLAY A ROLE IN A
CARETAKER GOVERNMENT, AND MAY EENTUALLY EMERGE AS A LEADER.
14. (C) SAFWAT ELSHERIF (NDP SECRETARY GENERAL AND SHURA
COUNCIL PEAKER), MUFEED SHEHAB (NDP ASSISTANT SYG, AND
MINISTER OF STATE FOR LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS, AND
ZAKARIA AZMY (NDP ASSISTANT SYG AND MUBARA´S DE FACTO CHIEF
OF STAFF) ALL, AS SENIOR LEADES OF THE NDP, MEET THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA T RUN FOR OFFICE. NONE OF THESE
GRIZZLED NDP VETERANS HAVE PUBLICLY EXPRESSED PRESIDENTIAL
ASPIRATONS, NOR DO THEY APPEAR TO POSSESS ANY CAPABILITIE
TO GOVERN, NOR PERSONAL CONSTITUENCIES. HOWEVE, WHILE
UNLIKELY, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT, ONCE MUBAAK PERE IS OUT OF
THE PICTURE, ONE OF THEM COULD EMERGE IN AN ANTI-GAMAL PARTY
PUTSCH. FURTHERMORE. MOST ANALYSTS HERE BELIEVE THAT ANY
GOVERNOR PUSHING FOR THE PRESIDENCY IS A FAR-FETCHED
POSSIBILITY - THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF GOVERNORS ARE
FORMER SENIOR MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICERS CHOSEN FOR THEIR
LOYALTY, FAR FROM THE CRITICAL POLITICAL FRAY IN CAIRO, AND
WITH NO POWER BASES.
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
------------------
15. (C) WHILE THE SPECTER OF AN MB PRESIDENCY HAUNTS SECULAR
EGYPTIANS, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY IN THE IMMEDIATE
POST-MUBARAK PERIOD. UNDER THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE
MB HAS NO ABILITY TO PUT FORWARD A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN
THE EVENT OF AN ELECTION. THE ORGANIZATION DOES NOT APPEAR
TO HAVE THE ORGANIZED MILITARY WING NECESSARY SHOULD IT WISH
TO ATTEMPT TO SEIZE THE PRESIDENCY BY FORCE. CONSTANT
OVERSIGHT OF THE ARMED FORCES AIMED AT ROOTING OUT POTENTIAL
ISLAMIST SYMPATHIZERS MEANS THAT FEW LIKELY REMAIN, ALTHOUGH
THE POSSIBILITY DOES EXIST THAT SOME CLOSE-MOUTHED MB-LEANING
OFFICERS ARE PRESENT. OVERALL, IN THE VIEW OF MOST EGYPTIAN
ANALYSTS, THE GROUP´S APPROACH SEEMS TO BE ONE OF PATIENCE
AND GRASS ROOTS BUILDING OF SUPPORT, WAITING FOR THE DAY WHEN
IT MIGHT COME TO POWER THROUGH POPULAR ELECTION, OR BY
POPULAR DEMAND AFTER A GAMAL PRESIDENCY HAS FOUNDERED.
------------------------
POST-SUCCESSION DYNAMICS
------------------------
16. (C) WHOEVER EGYPT´S NEXT PRESIDENT IS, HE WILL INEVITABLY
BE POLITICALLY WEAKER THAN MUBARAK, AND ONCE HE HAS ASSUMED
THE POST, AMONG HIS FIRST PRIORITIES WILL BE TO CEMENT HIS
POSITION AND BUILD POPULAR SUPPORT. WE CAN THUS ANTICIPATE
THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT MAY SOUND AN INITIAL ANTI-AMERICAN
TONE IN HIS PUBLIC RHETORIC, IN AN EFFORT TO PROVE HIS
NATIONALIST BONA FIDES TO THE EGYPTIAN STREET, AND DISTANCE
HIMSELF FROM MUBARAK´S POLICIES. IF HISTORY IS ANY GUIDE, WE
CAN ALSO EXPECT THE NEW PRESIDENT TO EXTEND AN OLIVE BRANCH
TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AS DID GAMAL ABDEL NASSER, ANWAR
EL SADAT, AND MUBARAK EARLY IN ALL OF THEIR TERMS, IN AN
EFFORT TO CO-OPT POTENTIAL OPPOSITION, AND BOOST POPULARITY.
RICCIARDONE
09.10.2007: EGYPT: UPDATED DEMOCRACY STRATEGY 27.jan.2011
...PREL, PHUM, KDEM, KMPI, EG SUBJECT: EGYPT: UPDATED DEMOCRACY STRATEGYREF: STATE...C) Our fundamental reform goal in Egypt remains democratic transformation, including...for our democracy promotion efforts in Egypt. End summary...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4008796.ece
14/05/2007: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN EGYPT 28.jan.2011
...EG SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN EGYPT REF: A. CAIRO 671 B. CAIRO 974 C. 2006...INCESSANT WHISPERED DISCUSSIONS, NO ONE IN EGYPT HAS ANY CERTAINTY ABOUT WHO WILL SUCCEED...PRESUMED AMBITION, HE IS THE ONLY PERSON IN EGYPT WHOSE TOTAL LOYALTY TO MUBARAK IS ALSO...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4008647.ece
26.02.2009: A NEW APPROACH TO EGYPT´S ESF 27.jan.2011
...robust economic assistance program for Egypt serves long-term U.S. interests...assistance levels to renew the U.S.-Egypt partnership around common goals, aimed...2. (S) Egypt has changed dramatically over the past...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4008848.ece
.
19/05/2009: SCENESETTER: PRESIDENT MUBARAK´S VISIT TO WASHINGTON 28.jan.2011
...Egyptians want the visit to demonstrate that Egypt remains America´s "indispensible Arab...left ear. He responds well to respect for Egypt and for his position, but is not swayed...downfall of Saddam. He routinely notes that Egypt did not like Saddam and does not mourn him...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4008657.ece
06.12.2007: EGYPT´S FY 2009 ESF: PROPOSED BUDGET FOR D&G 27.jan.2011
...for democracy and governance programs in Egypt for FY08 and $75m for FY09. These figures...programs carried out with the Government of Egypt in the areas of administration of justice...could consider adding funds from other Egypt ESF sources. END SUMMARY.2. (SBU...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4008819.ece
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...S/REL UAE, SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN, EGYPT, DENMARK, UNITED KINGDOM, RUSSIA, INDIA...POINTS FOR UAE, SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN, EGYPT, DENMARK, UNITED KINGDOM, RUSSIA, INDIA...Narodny Bank-London, and National Bank of Egypt International-London. According to April...
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20.10.2008: GAMAL MUBARAK ON ECONOMIC ISSUES AND THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 27.jan.2011
...crisis, and the possible ramifications for Egypt. He noted that the "silver lining" of...despite worldwide financial troubles, Egypt still hopes to meet its financial growth...that senior USG visitors will be coming to Egypt over the next few months, as we look towards...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4008833.ece
12/02/2010: DOES HAMAS HAVE A CASH FLOW PROBLEM IN GAZA? 25.jan.2011
...smuggling operations. Gaza contacts note that Egypt has also cracked down on the travel of...through the Rafah crossing. In particular, Egypt reportedly no longer tolerates "Hamas...removed by Aftenposten] speculated that Egypt has been effective in countering bulk...
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23.11.1994: SAUDI ARABIA: 1994 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 24.jan.2011
...SUSPECTED OF FINANCING TERRORISM IN YEMEN, SUDAN, AFGHANISTAN, EGYPT, LEBANON, AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR...REPORTS THAT THE SAG IS OR HAS BEEN FUNDING TERRORIST GROUPS IN EGYPT, ALGERIA AND ISRAEL. THERE WERE ALSO REPORTS THAT THE INTERNATIONAL...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4002952.ece
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...meets often with him. Most recently, Trabelsi is in talks with Egypts commercial giant Orascom about expanding Karthago into Egypt as a joint venture. 11. (C/NF) Other Leila siblings are Imed (controlling Societe Univers Carriers) and Moncef (owner...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3990437.ece
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...SUSPECTED OF FINANCING TERRORISM IN YEMEN, SUDAN, AFGHANISTAN, EGYPT, LEBANON, AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR...REPORTS THAT THE SAG IS OR HAS BEEN FUNDING TERRORIST GROUPS IN EGYPT, ALGERIA AND ISRAEL. THERE WERE ALSO REPORTS THAT THE INTERNATIONAL...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4002952.ece
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...meets often with him. Most recently, Trabelsi is in talks with Egypts commercial giant Orascom about expanding Karthago into Egypt as a joint venture. 11. (C/NF) Other Leila siblings are Imed (controlling Societe Univers Carriers) and Moncef (owner...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3990437.ece
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...American and international NGOs, regardless of her letter, on the grounds that these organizations do not have offices in Egypt; we will contend that therefore they do not require agreements with the MFA. But we will also work towards a more workable...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4008828.ece
+++
as a likely Mubarak succesor
The new vice president of Egypt has long been seen as a likely successor to the country's besieged president, Hosni Mubarak.
Omar Suleiman, the chief of the intelligence service, was among those whom U.S. diplomats viewed as probable successors to Mubarak once he died or became incapacitated, according to a leaked State Department cable obtained by Wikileaks.
However, Mubarak has given no signal that he intends to step down to clear the way for his right-hand man.
In an allusion to American organized crime, the 2007 cable describes Suleiman, who is in his mid seventies, as Mubarak's "consigliere" (Italian for "counselor"), who had often been "cited as likely to be named to the long-vacant vice-presidential post." The cable goes on to describe how the system is rigged as a bar to true democracy.
Suleiman might serve in a transitional role, though his liking for public service is clear, the cable says.
Suleiman's age and status, the cable reads, "could be attractive to the ruling apparatus and the public at large as a reliable figure unlikely to harbor ambitions for another multi-decade presidency."
Even if Mubarak's son, Gamal, were named president, Suleiman would probably have to consent, the cable says. The whereabouts of Gamal, a banker, are unknown. Another Wikileaks cable records a conversation Gamal had with Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman about the global financial crisis. Gamal warned that, if the United States didn't restore order to its banking system, Egypt would eventually feel the brunt of the fiscal crisis.
Gamal Mubarak, according to the cable which was cleared by Lieberman, gave no hint that ordinary Egyptians were already suffering from severe economic problems.
The Lieberman cable can be found at http://wikileaks.ch
The succession cable, as found on Oslo's Aftenposten, follows.
For a group of Wikileaks cables on Egypt, scroll down. Of note is that the leaked U.S. cable on high-level Tunisian corruption preceded the Tunisian revolution, which, however, was fanned by al Jazeera coverage.
C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 001417
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR WATERS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2017
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, EG
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN EGYPT
REF: A. CAIRO 671
B. CAIRO 974
C. 2006 CAIRO 2010
CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR FRANCIS J. RICCIARDONE,
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IS
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM OF EGYPTIAN POLITICS. DESPITE
INCESSANT WHISPERED DISCUSSIONS, NO ONE IN EGYPT HAS ANY
CERTAINTY ABOUT WHO WILL SUCCEED MUBARAK, OR HOW THE
SUCCESSION WILL HAPPEN. MUBARAK HIMSELF SEEMS TO BE TRUSTING
TO GOD AND THE INERTIA OF THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SECURITY
SERVICES TO ENSURE AN ORDERLY TRANSITION. IN THE CURRENT
POLITICAL FRAMEWORK, THE MOST LIKELY CONTENDERS ARE
PRESIDENTIAL SON GAMAL MUBARAK (WHOSE PROFILE IS
EVER-INCREASING AT THE RULING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY),
EGIS CHIEF OMAR SOLIMAN, DARK HORSE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY
GENERAL AMRE MOUSSA, OR AN AS-YET UNKNOWN MILITARY OFFICER.
WHOEVER ENDS UP AS EGYPT´S NEXT PRESIDENT LIKELY WILL BE
POLITICALLY WEAKER THAN MUBARAK. ONCE MUBARAK´S SUCCESSOR
HAS ASSUMED THE POST, HIS FIRST PRIORITY WILL BE TO BUILD
POPULAR SUPPORT. WE THUS EXPECT THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT WILL
LIKELY ADOPT AN ANTI-AMERICAN TONE IN HIS INITIAL PUBLIC
RHETORIC, IN AN EFFORT TO PROVE HIS NATIONALIST BONA FIDES TO
THE EGYPTIAN STREET, AND MAY POSSIBLY EXTEND AN OLIVE BRANCH
TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AS DID PREVIOUS EGYPTIAN
PRESIDENTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR TERMS. END SUMMARY.
------------------------------
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SUCCESSION
------------------------------
2. (C) PRESIDENT MUBARAK IS FOND OF OBSERVING THAT NO ONE
SHOULD HAVE ANY QUALMS REGARDING HIS SUCCESSION, SINCE
EGYPT´S CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A DETAILED GUIDE FOR HOW A
SUCCESSION SHOULD PROCEED. AMONG THE RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS WAS A NOTABLE CHANGE TO THE ARTICLE DETERMINING
WHICH OFFICIAL ASSUMES POWER IN THE EVENT OF THE TEMPORARY
INCAPACITATION OF THE PRESIDENT. ARTICLE 82, WHICH
PREVIOUSLY DELINEATED THAT THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHOULD ASSUME
PRESIDENTIAL POWERS "IF ON ACCOUNT OF ANY TEMPORARY OBSTACLE
THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO CARRY OUT HIS DUTIES," HAS BEEN
AMENDED SO THAT, IF THERE IS NO VICE-PRESIDENT, THE PRIME
MINISTER IS ASSIGNED PRESIDENTIAL POWERS. ARTICLE 84 READS,
"IN CASE OF THE VACANCY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE OR THE
PERMANENT DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT," THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PEOPLE´S ASSEMBLY (PA) OR THE PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT SHOULD TEMPORARILY ASSUME THE
PRESIDENCY. NEITHER WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE ALLOWED TO
NOMINATE HIMSELF FOR THE PRESIDENCY; THERE IS NO SUCH
STIPULATION AGAINST THE PM RUNNING FOR THE OFFICE. ARTICLE
84 GOES ON TO STIPULATE THAT, "THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
SHALL BE CHOSEN WITHIN A MAXIMUM PERIOD OF 60 DAYS FROM THE
DAY OF THE VACANCY OF THE PRESIDENCY."
3. (C) CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 76, WHICH PREVIOUSLY WIRED THE
EGYPTIAN ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK TO GUARANTEE THE PRESIDENCY TO
THE RULING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP), WAS ALSO AMONG
THE ARTICLES AMENDED IN APRIL (REF A). THE CHANGE WILL
OSTENSIBLY FACILITATE MORE COMPETITIVE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS, WHILE STILL PROTECTING AGAINST ANY SERIOUS
CHALLENGE TO THE NDP CANDIDATE. UNDER THE REVISIONS TO
ARTICLE 76, FOR AN INTERIM 10-YEAR PERIOD (I.E. UNTIL 2017),
LEGAL POLITICAL PARTIES WHICH HOLD AN ELECTED SEAT IN THE
PEOPLE´S ASSEMBLY OR SHURA COUNCIL CAN NOMINATE A
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE (CURRENTLY, ONLY FOUR PARTIES MEET
THIS REQUIREMENT - THE NDP, AL GHAD, AL WAFD, AND TAGGAMU).
FOLLOWING THE INTERIM PERIOD, IN ORDER TO RUN A PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATE:
-- A PARTY HAS TO HAVE BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR AT LEAST 5 YEARS
PRIOR TO THE ELECTION;
-- ITS CANDIDATE MUST HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OF THE HIGHEST
LEADERSHIP BODY OF THE PARTY FOR AT LEAST 1 YEAR; AND,
-- THE PARTY WOULD HAVE TO HOLD AT LEAST 3% OF THE SEATS IN
BOTH PARLIAMENTARY HOUSES (I.E., 14 SEATS IN THE PEOPLE´S
ASSEMBLY, AND 6 SEATS IN THE SHURA COUNCIL), OR 6% OF THE
SEATS
IN EITHER THE PA OR SHURA COUNCIL).
4. (C) GENUINELY INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES FACE AN ALMOST
IMPOSSIBLE BAR TO ENTER THE RACE. TO COMPETE IN THE NEXT
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, ARTICLE 76 STATES THAT AN
"INDEPENDENT" MUST OBTAIN ENDORSEMENTS FROM 250 ELECTED
MEMBERS OF EGYPT´S NATIONAL AND LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE BODIES,
OF WHICH THERE MUST BE A MINIMUM OF 65 ENDORSEMENTS FROM
MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY, 25 FROM THE SHURA COUNCIL,
AND 10 FROM LOCAL COUNCILS IN AT LEAST 14 GOVERNORATES. THIS
WOULD BE A NEAR UNATTAINABLE FEAT FOR A NON-NDP CANDIDATE TO
ACHIEVE, GIVEN THE RULING PARTY´S DOMINATION OF ALL EGYPTIAN
ELECTED BODIES. IN EFFECT, THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 76
ACCOMPLISH TWO OBJECTIVES REGARDING INDEPENDENTS: THE RULING
PARTY CAN BLOCK THE EMERGENCE OF ANY GENUINELY "INDEPENDENT"
CANDIDATE, WHILE IT COULD THEORETICALLY REACH BEYOND THE
NDP´S TOP LEADERSHIP TO SELECT AN "INDEPENDENT" WHOM THE
RULING ELITE JUDGES WILL BEST PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS,
PROVIDED THE NDP RETAINS PARTY DISCIPLINE.
--------------------
POTENTIAL CANDIDATES
--------------------
5. (C) PRESIDENT MUBARAK, WHO BEGAN HIS FIFTH 6-YEAR TERM IN
SEPTEMBER 2005, RECENTLY TURNED 79. THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION IS DUE TO BE HELD IN 2011. BY THE TIME MUBARAK
SERVES HIS FULL TERM, THERE MAY BE OTHER CANDIDATES IN THE
WINGS, OR MUBARAK HIMSELF COULD CHOOSE TO RUN AGAIN FOR THE
PRESIDENCY. HE IS ON RECORD AS SAYING, IN A NOVEMBER 2006
SPEECH, THAT HE PLANNED TO REMAIN PRESIDENT "AS LONG AS I
HAVE A HEART THAT BEATS, AND BREATH IN MY BODY." BUT IF THE
SUCCESSION HAPPENED TOMORROW, EGYPTIAN PARLOR SPECULATION
FOCUSES ON THE FOLLOWING AS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS.
GAMAL MUBARAK
-------------
6. (C) CAIRENE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HOLDS THAT GAMAL WANTS THE
JOB, DESPITE HIS REPEATED DENIALS TO THE CONTRARY (REF B).
THE MOST RECENT SUCH ABJURATION WAS ON MAY 2, DURING AN
INTERVIEW WITH THE ORBIT SATELLITE TV CHANNEL, WHEN GAMAL
STATED THAT, "I DO NOT HAVE THE INTENTION AND AMBITION TO RUN
FOR PRESIDENT ... WHATEVER THE PARTY SAYS DOES NOT MATTER. I
AM NOT LOOKING FOR ANY EXECUTIVE POST." SUCH COY DEMURRALS
RING HOLLOW IN THE FACE OF HIS INCREASINGLY ROBUST ROLE
WITHIN THE NDP (FAR EXCEEDING THAT OF HIS COUNTERPARTS IN THE
PARTY HIERARCHY), HIS APPARENTLY CENTRAL ROLE IN CREATING NEW
LEGISLATION, AND HIS RECENT TOURS TO VARIOUS GOVERNORATES
FEATURING MINISTERIAL ENTOURAGES. IT IS HARD TO ARGUE THAT
GAMAL IS NOT BEING GROOMED FOR THE PRESIDENCY.
7. (C) MANY IN THE EGYPTIAN ELITE SEE HIS SUCCESSION AS
POSITIVE, AS HIS LIKELY CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT STATUS
QUO WOULD SERVE THEIR BUSINESS AND POLITICAL INTERESTS.
GIVEN THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CANDIDACY, AND WEAK
OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP, THERE ARE CURRENTLY FEW OTHER EGYPTIAN
PERSONALITIES WITH THE NATIONAL STATURE AND POLITICAL CAPITAL
TO SERIOUSLY CONTEND FOR THE PRESIDENCY. LIKEWISE, DUE TO
THE PARANOIA OF THE EGYPTIAN DICTATORSHIP, NO OTHER NAME CAN
SAFELY OR RESPECTFULLY BE BRUITED AS A CONTENDER. WHILE THE
PRESIDENT´S SON IS VULNERABLE TO OPEN CRITICISM FOR HIS
PRESUMED AMBITION, HE IS THE ONLY PERSON IN EGYPT WHOSE TOTAL
LOYALTY TO MUBARAK IS ALSO TAKEN FOR GRANTED, SO HIS IS THE
ONLY NAME THAT CAN POSSIBLY BE BANDIED ABOUT.
8. (C) A KEY STUMBLING BLOCK FOR A GAMAL CANDIDACY COULD BE
THE MILITARY. EACH OF EGYPT´S FOUR PRESIDENTS SINCE 1952
AROSE FROM THE OFFICER CORPS, AND THE MILITARY HAS
HISTORICALLY BEEN THE ULTIMATE GUARANTOR OF THE PRESIDENT´S
RULE. GAMAL DID NOT SERVE AS A MILITARY OFFICER, AND WE
BELIEVE HE DID NOT COMPLETE HIS COMPULSORY SERVICE. MANY
OBSERVERS OPINE THAT TIMING IS THE CRUCIAL FACTOR FOR A
POTENTIAL GAMAL PRESIDENCY - HIS POWER BASE IS HIS FATHER,
AND SO WHILE HE COULD CONCEIVABLY BE INSTALLED PRIOR TO
MUBARAK´S DEATH, THE TASK WOULD BECOME FAR MORE DIFFICULT,
ALTHOUGH NOT INSURMOUNTABLE, ONCE THE PHARAOH HAS DEPARTED
THE SCENE, AND PERSONAL LOYALTIES TO HIM ARE IN THE PAST.
ALTHOUGH THERE IS WIDESPREAD POPULAR ANIMUS AGAINST A GAMAL
CANDIDACY, WITH MANY EGYPTIANS OPINING PROUDLY THAT, "WE ARE
NOT SYRIA OR SAUDI!", THE NDP MACHINERY COULD LIKELY STAGE AN
ELECTORAL VICTORY, BASED ON POOR VOTER TURNOUT, SLOPPY VOTER
LISTS, AND STATE CONTROL OF THE ELECTION APPARATUS.
OMAR SOLIMAN
-------------
9. (C) EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF AND MUBARAK CONSIGLIERE,
IN PAST YEARS SOLIMAN WAS OFTEN CITED AS LIKELY TO BE NAMED
TO THE LONG-VACANT VICE-PRESIDENTIAL POST. IN THE PAST TWO
YEARS, SOLIMAN HAS STEPPED OUT OF THE SHADOWS, AND ALLOWED
HIMSELF TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED, AND HIS MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN
LEADERS REPORTED. MANY OF OUR CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT SOLIMAN,
BECAUSE OF HIS MILITARY BACKGROUND, WOULD AT THE LEAST HAVE
TO FIGURE IN ANY SUCCESSION SCENARIO FOR GAMAL, POSSIBLY AS A
TRANSITIONAL FIGURE. SOLIMAN HIMSELF ADAMANTLY DENIES ANY
PERSONAL AMBITIONS, BUT HIS INTEREST AND DEDICATION TO
NATIONAL SERVICE IS OBVIOUS. HIS LOYALTY TO MUBARAK SEEMS
ROCK-SOLID. AT AGE 71, HE COULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO THE RULING
APPARATUS AND THE PUBLIC AT LARGE AS A RELIABLE FIGURE
UNLIKELY TO HARBOR AMBITIONS FOR ANOTHER MULTI-DECADE
PRESIDENCY. A KEY UNANSWERED QUESTION IS HOW HE WOULD
RESPOND TO A GAMAL PRESIDENCY ONCE MUBARAK IS DEAD. AN
ALLEGED PERSONAL FRIEND OF SOLIMAN TELLS US THAT SOLIMAN
"DETESTS" THE IDEA OF GAMAL AS PRESIDENT, AND THAT HE ALSO
WAS "DEEPLY PERSONALLY HURT" BY MUBARAK, WHO PROMISED TO NAME
HIM VICE-PRESIDENT SEVERAL YEARS AGO, BUT THEN RENEGED.
AMRE MOUSSA
-----------
10. (C) THE CHARISMATIC ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL
PRUDENTLY HAS NEVER INDICATED INTENTION OR AMBITION TO ENTER
INTO EGYPTS DOMESTIC POLITICAL FRAY, AND HAS NO EGYPTIAN
INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL PLATFORM FROM WHICH TO SPRING.
HOWEVER, AS THE HIGH-PROFILE ELDER STATESMAN OF ARAB CAUSES,
HE ENJOYS CONSIDERABLE STREET CREDIBILITY, POPULARITY, AND
PERCEIVED GRAVITAS. IT IS FAR-FETCHED BUT CONCEIVABLE THAT,
IN A LEADERSHIP CRISIS FOLLOWING MUBARAK´S DEATH, MOUSSA
COULD EMERGE AS A PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDER, PROVIDED THAT HE IS
AN NDP MEMBER, OR IF THE NDP WERE TO PROMOTE HIM UNDER THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ALLOWED FOR INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES.
MILITARY OFFICER
----------------
11. (C) CURRENTLY, THERE IS NO OBVIOUS CONTENDER FROM AMONG
THE OFFICER CORPS, EGYPT´S TRADITIONAL PRESIDENTIAL
RECRUITMENT GROUNDS. MINISTER OF DEFENSE TANTAWI, A
CONTEMPORARY OF MUBARAK´S, APPEARS TO HARBOR NO POLITICAL
AMBITIONS. LIKE SOLIMAN, HE COULD PLAY A ROLE IN CLEARING
THE WAY FOR GAMAL, IF HE CALCULATES THAT IS IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY; CONVERSELY, HE COULD ALSO BE A KEY
PLAYER IN PREVENTING GAMALS ASCENDANCE. WE HAVE HEARD SOME
LIMITED REPORTS OF TANTAWIS INCREASING FRUSTRATION AND
DISENCHANTMENT WITH GAMAL (REF B). IN THE EVENT OF A NATIONAL
LEADERSHIP CRISIS, IT IS NEAR INCONCEIVABLE THAT GIVEN
MUBARAK´S PERSONAL MANIPULATION OF THE OFFICE CORPS, THAT
ANOTHER MILITARY OFFICER COULD EMERGE FROM OBSCURITY TO
ASSERT HIMSELF AS A CANDIDATE. BUT TANTAWI AND HIS SENIOR
COTERIE ARE NOT NECESSARILY POPULAR AT MID AND LOWER RANKS,
SO THE POSSIBILITY OF A MID-20TH CENTURY STYLE COUP OF
COLONELS CANNOT BE ENTIRELY DISCOUNTED.
OPPOSITION MEMBER
-----------------
12. (C) OF THE 10 PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS IN 2005,
SECOND-PLACE AL GHAD PARTY LEADER AYMAN NOUR IS CURRENTLY
SERVING A SEVEN-YEAR JAIL TERM, AND ACCORDING TO EGYPTIAN
LAW, WILL BE BANNED FROM PARTICIPATING IN EGYPTIAN POLITICAL
LIFE FOR SEVERAL YEARS FOLLOWING HIS RELEASE. THE
THIRD-PLACE FINISHER, AL WAFD PARTY CANDIDATE NO´MAN GOMAA,
LOST HIS PARTY POSITION FOLLOWING A VIOLENT AND
SCANDAL-RIDDEN LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE. THE OTHER EIGHT
CANDIDATES, MARGINAL FIGURES TO BEGIN WITH, HAVE FADED BACK
INTO TOTAL OBSCURITY. CURRENT AL WAFD LEADER MAHMOUD ABAZA
IS A TALENTED POLITICIAN, BUT AT THIS POINT, DOES NOT APPEAR
TO HAVE NATIONAL APPEAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY TO MOUNT A
SERIOUS ATTEMPT AT THE PRESIDENCY.
DARK HORSE AND ALSO RANS
------------------------
13. (C) POPULAR REFORMIST MINISTER OF TRADE RACHID IS A
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE, THOUGH A DISTINCT DARK HORSE.
NONETHELESS, HE COMES FROM AN OLD AND RESPECTED FAMILY AND IS
SEEN BY MANY AS LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR EGYPT´S IMPRESSIVE
ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE PAST THREE YEARS. INTERESTINGLY, THE
HEAD OF CAIRO´S LARGE AND INFLUENTIAL AMCHAM, WHO KNOWS
RACHID WELL, TOLD US THAT, AFTER NEGOTIATING THE
CONTROVERSIAL QIZ PROGRAM, THE MINISTER "REALLY NEEDS
MOVEMENT ON THE FTA FOR POLITICAL COVER," RAISING THE
QUESTION: POLITICAL COVER FOR WHAT? WHILE IT IS HIGHLY
UNLIKELY RACHID WOULD TAKE ON GAMAL HEAD-TO-HEAD, WE CANNOT
DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WILLPLAY A ROLE IN A
CARETAKER GOVERNMENT, AND MAY EENTUALLY EMERGE AS A LEADER.
14. (C) SAFWAT ELSHERIF (NDP SECRETARY GENERAL AND SHURA
COUNCIL PEAKER), MUFEED SHEHAB (NDP ASSISTANT SYG, AND
MINISTER OF STATE FOR LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS, AND
ZAKARIA AZMY (NDP ASSISTANT SYG AND MUBARA´S DE FACTO CHIEF
OF STAFF) ALL, AS SENIOR LEADES OF THE NDP, MEET THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA T RUN FOR OFFICE. NONE OF THESE
GRIZZLED NDP VETERANS HAVE PUBLICLY EXPRESSED PRESIDENTIAL
ASPIRATONS, NOR DO THEY APPEAR TO POSSESS ANY CAPABILITIE
TO GOVERN, NOR PERSONAL CONSTITUENCIES. HOWEVE, WHILE
UNLIKELY, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT, ONCE MUBAAK PERE IS OUT OF
THE PICTURE, ONE OF THEM COULD EMERGE IN AN ANTI-GAMAL PARTY
PUTSCH. FURTHERMORE. MOST ANALYSTS HERE BELIEVE THAT ANY
GOVERNOR PUSHING FOR THE PRESIDENCY IS A FAR-FETCHED
POSSIBILITY - THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF GOVERNORS ARE
FORMER SENIOR MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICERS CHOSEN FOR THEIR
LOYALTY, FAR FROM THE CRITICAL POLITICAL FRAY IN CAIRO, AND
WITH NO POWER BASES.
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
------------------
15. (C) WHILE THE SPECTER OF AN MB PRESIDENCY HAUNTS SECULAR
EGYPTIANS, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY IN THE IMMEDIATE
POST-MUBARAK PERIOD. UNDER THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE
MB HAS NO ABILITY TO PUT FORWARD A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN
THE EVENT OF AN ELECTION. THE ORGANIZATION DOES NOT APPEAR
TO HAVE THE ORGANIZED MILITARY WING NECESSARY SHOULD IT WISH
TO ATTEMPT TO SEIZE THE PRESIDENCY BY FORCE. CONSTANT
OVERSIGHT OF THE ARMED FORCES AIMED AT ROOTING OUT POTENTIAL
ISLAMIST SYMPATHIZERS MEANS THAT FEW LIKELY REMAIN, ALTHOUGH
THE POSSIBILITY DOES EXIST THAT SOME CLOSE-MOUTHED MB-LEANING
OFFICERS ARE PRESENT. OVERALL, IN THE VIEW OF MOST EGYPTIAN
ANALYSTS, THE GROUP´S APPROACH SEEMS TO BE ONE OF PATIENCE
AND GRASS ROOTS BUILDING OF SUPPORT, WAITING FOR THE DAY WHEN
IT MIGHT COME TO POWER THROUGH POPULAR ELECTION, OR BY
POPULAR DEMAND AFTER A GAMAL PRESIDENCY HAS FOUNDERED.
------------------------
POST-SUCCESSION DYNAMICS
------------------------
16. (C) WHOEVER EGYPT´S NEXT PRESIDENT IS, HE WILL INEVITABLY
BE POLITICALLY WEAKER THAN MUBARAK, AND ONCE HE HAS ASSUMED
THE POST, AMONG HIS FIRST PRIORITIES WILL BE TO CEMENT HIS
POSITION AND BUILD POPULAR SUPPORT. WE CAN THUS ANTICIPATE
THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT MAY SOUND AN INITIAL ANTI-AMERICAN
TONE IN HIS PUBLIC RHETORIC, IN AN EFFORT TO PROVE HIS
NATIONALIST BONA FIDES TO THE EGYPTIAN STREET, AND DISTANCE
HIMSELF FROM MUBARAK´S POLICIES. IF HISTORY IS ANY GUIDE, WE
CAN ALSO EXPECT THE NEW PRESIDENT TO EXTEND AN OLIVE BRANCH
TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AS DID GAMAL ABDEL NASSER, ANWAR
EL SADAT, AND MUBARAK EARLY IN ALL OF THEIR TERMS, IN AN
EFFORT TO CO-OPT POTENTIAL OPPOSITION, AND BOOST POPULARITY.
RICCIARDONE
09.10.2007: EGYPT: UPDATED DEMOCRACY STRATEGY 27.jan.2011
...PREL, PHUM, KDEM, KMPI, EG SUBJECT: EGYPT: UPDATED DEMOCRACY STRATEGYREF: STATE...C) Our fundamental reform goal in Egypt remains democratic transformation, including...for our democracy promotion efforts in Egypt. End summary...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4008796.ece
14/05/2007: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN EGYPT 28.jan.2011
...EG SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN EGYPT REF: A. CAIRO 671 B. CAIRO 974 C. 2006...INCESSANT WHISPERED DISCUSSIONS, NO ONE IN EGYPT HAS ANY CERTAINTY ABOUT WHO WILL SUCCEED...PRESUMED AMBITION, HE IS THE ONLY PERSON IN EGYPT WHOSE TOTAL LOYALTY TO MUBARAK IS ALSO...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4008647.ece
26.02.2009: A NEW APPROACH TO EGYPT´S ESF 27.jan.2011
...robust economic assistance program for Egypt serves long-term U.S. interests...assistance levels to renew the U.S.-Egypt partnership around common goals, aimed...2. (S) Egypt has changed dramatically over the past...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4008848.ece
.
19/05/2009: SCENESETTER: PRESIDENT MUBARAK´S VISIT TO WASHINGTON 28.jan.2011
...Egyptians want the visit to demonstrate that Egypt remains America´s "indispensible Arab...left ear. He responds well to respect for Egypt and for his position, but is not swayed...downfall of Saddam. He routinely notes that Egypt did not like Saddam and does not mourn him...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4008657.ece
06.12.2007: EGYPT´S FY 2009 ESF: PROPOSED BUDGET FOR D&G 27.jan.2011
...for democracy and governance programs in Egypt for FY08 and $75m for FY09. These figures...programs carried out with the Government of Egypt in the areas of administration of justice...could consider adding funds from other Egypt ESF sources. END SUMMARY.2. (SBU...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4008819.ece
12.5.2009: UNSC 1718 COMMITTEE DESIGNATION OF DPRK ENTITIES SUBJECT TO ASSET FREEZE 14.jan.2011
...S/REL UAE, SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN, EGYPT, DENMARK, UNITED KINGDOM, RUSSIA, INDIA...POINTS FOR UAE, SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN, EGYPT, DENMARK, UNITED KINGDOM, RUSSIA, INDIA...Narodny Bank-London, and National Bank of Egypt International-London. According to April...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3988329.ece
20.10.2008: GAMAL MUBARAK ON ECONOMIC ISSUES AND THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 27.jan.2011
...crisis, and the possible ramifications for Egypt. He noted that the "silver lining" of...despite worldwide financial troubles, Egypt still hopes to meet its financial growth...that senior USG visitors will be coming to Egypt over the next few months, as we look towards...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4008833.ece
12/02/2010: DOES HAMAS HAVE A CASH FLOW PROBLEM IN GAZA? 25.jan.2011
...smuggling operations. Gaza contacts note that Egypt has also cracked down on the travel of...through the Rafah crossing. In particular, Egypt reportedly no longer tolerates "Hamas...removed by Aftenposten] speculated that Egypt has been effective in countering bulk...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4004534.ece
23.11.1994: SAUDI ARABIA: 1994 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 24.jan.2011
...SUSPECTED OF FINANCING TERRORISM IN YEMEN, SUDAN, AFGHANISTAN, EGYPT, LEBANON, AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR...REPORTS THAT THE SAG IS OR HAS BEEN FUNDING TERRORIST GROUPS IN EGYPT, ALGERIA AND ISRAEL. THERE WERE ALSO REPORTS THAT THE INTERNATIONAL...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4002952.ece
05.07.2006: 05.07.2006: CORRUPTION IN TUNISIA PART III: POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 15.jan.2011
...meets often with him. Most recently, Trabelsi is in talks with Egypts commercial giant Orascom about expanding Karthago into Egypt as a joint venture. 11. (C/NF) Other Leila siblings are Imed (controlling Societe Univers Carriers) and Moncef (owner...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3990437.ece
23.11.1994: SAUDI ARABIA: 1994 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 24.jan.2011
...SUSPECTED OF FINANCING TERRORISM IN YEMEN, SUDAN, AFGHANISTAN, EGYPT, LEBANON, AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR...REPORTS THAT THE SAG IS OR HAS BEEN FUNDING TERRORIST GROUPS IN EGYPT, ALGERIA AND ISRAEL. THERE WERE ALSO REPORTS THAT THE INTERNATIONAL...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4002952.ece
05.07.2006: 05.07.2006: CORRUPTION IN TUNISIA PART III: POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 15.jan.2011
...meets often with him. Most recently, Trabelsi is in talks with Egypts commercial giant Orascom about expanding Karthago into Egypt as a joint venture. 11. (C/NF) Other Leila siblings are Imed (controlling Societe Univers Carriers) and Moncef (owner...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3990437.ece
28.02.2008: ADDRESSING MIC´S OBJECTIONS TO D&G FUNDING FOR "UNREGISTERED" NGOS 27.jan.2011
...American and international NGOs, regardless of her letter, on the grounds that these organizations do not have offices in Egypt; we will contend that therefore they do not require agreements with the MFA. But we will also work towards a more workable...
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4008828.ece
+++
Monday, January 24, 2011
Was 9/11 an inside job?
Beck seems to think so
Glenn Beck, the Fox News commentator, promotes the idea that the 9/11 attacks were an inside job with his new book, The Overton Window.
The book concerns a race to "uncover the conspirators behind a catastrophic terrorist attack" and save the "individual freedoms" once taken for granted, according to a note on the back cover. Though the book is fiction, Beck adds an appendix in which he cites various sources to show that conspiracies are afoot.
The "Overton window," as the book says, is a scheme to shift what is acceptable in public discourse toward radical ideas.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Bernays
In the appendix, which is meant to be taken seriously, Beck includes information that has raised anxiety levels on the internet -- such as the readying of large camps that might be used as internment centers -- but which has been played down or ignored by much of mainstream media.
Beck begins his list with this:
Rumsfeld announces $2.3 trillion unaccounted for on Sept. 10, 2001. "Defense Department cannot account for 25% of funds -- $2.3 trillion"--CBS News, Jan. 29, 2002, http://www.cbsnews.com/
"According to some estimates we cannot track $2.3 trillion in transactions," Rumsfeld admitted in the CBS report.
"We know it's gone. But we don't know what they spent it on," said Jim Minnery, of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service.
A YouTube video of the broadcast is found at http://www.youtube.com/watch?
Beck observes that on Sept. 11, 2001, "some missing money (even trillions of it) didn't seem quite so important anymore."
The Overton Window was published this month by the Pocket Books imprint of Simon and Schuster.
In a Jan. 21 editorial, Paranoia runs deep, New York's Daily News blasted the appointment of Richard Falk, a Princeton professor, to a UN human rights council and denounced him for bringing up the "whackadoo" possibility that the trade center towers were felled by explosives planted by forces within the U.S. government.
"Ignore those jetliners crashing into the towers, is his advice," the News says. "Who are you going to believe, your own eyes or him and his friends?" The News, published by Mortimer B. Zuckerman, has done no in-depth investigative reporting concerning the 9/11 attacks, even though they occurred in the paper's home town. Arthur Browne is editorial page editor.
Falk, who has long worked with the UN on monitoring Palestinian troubles, is biased against Israel, the News says.
Geraldo Rivera, another Fox news commentator, last night was strongly sympathetic to the beleaguered Julian Assange and Wikileaks. Rivera said that whether or not Wikileaks was friend or foe seemed to have a lot to do with what was being published. He and his guests expressed great interest and enthusiasm for the promised exposure by Wikileaks of 2000 super-rich tax cheats, many of them Americans.
Rivera also scoffed at U.S. officials who branded Assange a traitor, pointing out that Assange is Australian (and so can't very well break American treason law).
Beck seems to think so
Glenn Beck, the Fox News commentator, promotes the idea that the 9/11 attacks were an inside job with his new book, The Overton Window.
The book concerns a race to "uncover the conspirators behind a catastrophic terrorist attack" and save the "individual freedoms" once taken for granted, according to a note on the back cover. Though the book is fiction, Beck adds an appendix in which he cites various sources to show that conspiracies are afoot.
The "Overton window," as the book says, is a scheme to shift what is acceptable in public discourse toward radical ideas.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Bernays
In the appendix, which is meant to be taken seriously, Beck includes information that has raised anxiety levels on the internet -- such as the readying of large camps that might be used as internment centers -- but which has been played down or ignored by much of mainstream media.
Beck begins his list with this:
Rumsfeld announces $2.3 trillion unaccounted for on Sept. 10, 2001. "Defense Department cannot account for 25% of funds -- $2.3 trillion"--CBS News, Jan. 29, 2002, http://www.cbsnews.com/
"According to some estimates we cannot track $2.3 trillion in transactions," Rumsfeld admitted in the CBS report.
"We know it's gone. But we don't know what they spent it on," said Jim Minnery, of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service.
A YouTube video of the broadcast is found at http://www.youtube.com/watch?
Beck observes that on Sept. 11, 2001, "some missing money (even trillions of it) didn't seem quite so important anymore."
The Overton Window was published this month by the Pocket Books imprint of Simon and Schuster.
In a Jan. 21 editorial, Paranoia runs deep, New York's Daily News blasted the appointment of Richard Falk, a Princeton professor, to a UN human rights council and denounced him for bringing up the "whackadoo" possibility that the trade center towers were felled by explosives planted by forces within the U.S. government.
"Ignore those jetliners crashing into the towers, is his advice," the News says. "Who are you going to believe, your own eyes or him and his friends?" The News, published by Mortimer B. Zuckerman, has done no in-depth investigative reporting concerning the 9/11 attacks, even though they occurred in the paper's home town. Arthur Browne is editorial page editor.
Falk, who has long worked with the UN on monitoring Palestinian troubles, is biased against Israel, the News says.
Geraldo Rivera, another Fox news commentator, last night was strongly sympathetic to the beleaguered Julian Assange and Wikileaks. Rivera said that whether or not Wikileaks was friend or foe seemed to have a lot to do with what was being published. He and his guests expressed great interest and enthusiasm for the promised exposure by Wikileaks of 2000 super-rich tax cheats, many of them Americans.
Rivera also scoffed at U.S. officials who branded Assange a traitor, pointing out that Assange is Australian (and so can't very well break American treason law).
Friday, January 21, 2011
China missile exports focus
of leaked State Dept. report
China's export of missile materials to Iran, Pakistan and North Korea is spotlighted in a leaked State Department cable.
Beijing has a spotty record of curbing missile-related exports, according to the January 2008 cable, a part of the Wikileaks cache published by Norway's Aftenposten newspaper.
However, the Chinese, concerned about China's image in preparation of the 2008 Olympic Games, appeared to have curtailed some such exports to Iran. North Korea had been aided by Beijing to a "lesser extent" than either Iran or Pakistan, the cable says.
Beijing is reluctant to monitor sales to front companies acting as cut-outs for Iran, the cabled report says.
Beijing has a spotty record of curbing missile-related exports, according to the January 2008 cable, a part of the Wikileaks cache published by Norway's Aftenposten newspaper.
However, the Chinese, concerned about China's image in preparation of the 2008 Olympic Games, appeared to have curtailed some such exports to Iran. North Korea had been aided by Beijing to a "lesser extent" than either Iran or Pakistan, the cable says.
Beijing is reluctant to monitor sales to front companies acting as cut-outs for Iran, the cabled report says.
"China's efforts to enforce its export controls, while improving in some areas, remain incomplete," the cable says. "Several entities, including both state-owned and private firms, have continued to sell items to Iran's missile programs, in some cases even after being the subject of investigations by Chinese authorities. Such cases suggest that Beijing has not imposed adequate measures to deter future sales that pose missile proliferation concerns."
The fact that China has been assisting neighboring Pakistan in missile capability implies complications in the NATO war effort in Afghanistan, which borders Pakistan. The Obama administration needs to work closely with Pakistan on the war effort. Yet, China's goals in the region are unlikely to be identical to America's. So Pakistan is beset by two powerful nations sometimes working at cross purposes.
The cable, as published by Aftenposten, follows:
1.10.2008: : MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): CHINAS RECORD ON CONTROLLING MISSILE-RELATED EXPORTS
S E C R E T STATE 105132
SIPDIS PARIS FOR EST: HELEN SMITH LONDON FOR CHRIS PALMER CANBERRA FOR CAROL HANLON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2033 TAGS: MTCRE, ETTC, KSCA, MNUC, PARM, TSPA, FR, UK, AS, CH SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): CHINAS RECORD ON CONTROLLING MISSILE-RELATED EXPORTS
Classified By: ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham. Reasons: 1.4 (B), (D), (H).
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 2.
2. (S) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests Embassy Paris provide the interagency cleared paper "Chinas Record on Controlling Missile-Related Exports" in paragraph 3 below to the French Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Point of Contact (POC) for distribution to all Partners. Department also requests Embassy London provide paper to the MTCR Information Exchange (IE) Co-Chair (John Andrews), and Embassy Canberra provide paper to the Australian MTCR Plenary Chair for 2008/2009 and/or appropriate staff. Info addressees also may provide to host government officials as appropriate. In delivering paper, posts should indicate that the U.S. is sharing this paper as part of our preparation for the Information Exchange that will be held in conjunction with the MTCR Plenary in Canberra (November 3-7). NOTE: Additional IE papers will be provided via septels. END NOTE.
3. (S) BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER:
(SECRET REL MTCR)
Chinas Record on Controlling Missile-Related Exports
China in recent years has taken some positive steps to curb ballistic missile-related proliferation, and we have seen some limited improvements continue over the past year, particularly in regard to sales by some state-owned enterprises to Iran. Despite indicators that Chinese authorities are gradually adopting more responsible export control policies, Chinese firms over the past year have sold ballistic missile-related items - mostly metals and other raw materials - to Iran, Pakistan, and to a lesser extent, North Korea, and marketed sub-MTCR-class ballistic missile systems and technology to a growing range of customers. Such activities are indicative of Chinas uneven track record in enforcing its missile-related export controls.
Increased Export Control Efforts by China
Over the past year, Beijing appears to have increased its efforts to have Chinas defense trade firms move away from WMD- and ballistic missile-related sales to Tehran. This decision is most likely partially attributable to the international scrutiny on Irans nuclear program, including the numerous UN Security Council Resolutions which also limit missile-related trade, and Chinas calculation that such sales had the potential to tarnish Chinas image in the run-up to the August 2008 Olympics in Beijing. Whatever the motivations of Chinese authorities, we assess that several of Chinas state-owned enterprises - including entities such as China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO), China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation (CPMIEC), China Xinshidai Company, and China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC), have curtailed ballistic missile-related sales to Iran. However, it is unclear how long Chinas commitment to curbing some sales to Iran will last. Debate within China about whether Chinese firms should resume their earlier level of trade in sensitive military and dual-use technologies with Iran most likely is ongoing. It remains to be seen whether Chinese authorities resolve to curtail such transfers will weaken following the conclusion of the Olympics.
Another positive indicator is that Beijing over the past year has engaged in a bilateral nonproliferation dialogue with the U.S. and Chinese enforcement authorities have worked with U.S. officials to begin to close gaps in Chinas export control system. China also has accepted U.S. offers of export-control-related training. For example, Chinese export control officials participated in a January 2008 U.S.-China industry-government relations forum designed to encourage industry to comply with national export control regulations. Over 40 Chinese officials representing six ministries attended the workshop. Additionally, in a new development designed to complement our bilateral nonproliferation dialogue, the United States proposed and China agreed in late 2007 to allow U.S. officials to engage in nonproliferation discussions directly with some state-owned enterprises, such as NORINCO and CGWIC.
Enforcement Efforts Incomplete
Chinas efforts to enforce its export controls, while improving in some areas, remain incomplete. Several entities, including both state-owned and private firms, have continued to sell items to Irans missile programs, in some cases even after being the subject of investigations by Chinese authorities. Such cases suggest that Beijing has not imposed adequate measures to deter future sales that pose missile proliferation concerns.
One such example involves the Chinese firm LIMMT. The U.S. has discussed this firms missile-related exports to Iran extensively with Chinese authorities over the last several years. In response to these approaches, China has stopped several proliferation-related transfers by LIMMT to Iran. However, in 2007 and 2008, LIMMT, operating under the name Dalian Sunny Industry, supplied a range of raw materials to Irans solid-propellant missile organization Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG). China has indicated its enforcement agencies are working to find a legal basis to curtail this firms cooperation with Irans missile program and last year Chinas Ministry of Commerce reportedly decided to take punitive action against the company. However, the company appealed the measures and its proliferant activities have continued. Our information indicates that LIMMTs main representative is a former government official who has been using his government connections to conduct business and possibly protect himsel f from Beijings enforcement actions. More broadly, Chinas ability to successfully resolve this case may be further complicated by Chinas national-level officials tendency to relinquish some control of investigations to the provincial level. Leads on impending proliferation-related transactions reportedly are passed to relevant regional offices for investigation. Although these offices have the freedom to act independently to stop a shipment once being referred a case, a lack of national-level oversight probably allows local level officials to continue to shield firms in their economic zones.
In another example, the U.S. has obtained information in recent years that Chinese firms have made several shipments of sodium perchlorate to Irans Parchin Chemical Industries. Sodium perchlorate can be used to manufacture the MTCR-controlled oxidizer ammonium perchlorate (AP), which Iran uses in its solid propellant ballistic missiles. In one case involving sodium perchlorate, a Chinese firm likely used what we assess to be a cover company to ship sodium perchlorate to Iran. Additionally, we assess other Chinese firms over the past year have supplied Iranian ballistic missile organizations with graphite, metals, and the solid-propellant fuel aluminum powder. In many cases, they have used front company names.
China has continued to act as a key supplier of technical assistance, raw materials, and other items to missile programs in Pakistan, although Islamabads reliance on Chinese ballistic missile-related assistance has decreased as its ballistic missile programs have matured. Over the past year China has supplied truck chassis to Pakistan that we assess are for conversion into missile transporter-erector-launchers and ground support equipment for Pakistans ballistic missile force. Additionally, Pakistans Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), which historically has been responsible for the Abdali solid-propellant SRBM program as well as Pakistans space program, procured MTCR-controlled unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) from China Xinshidai Company in late 2007. This material can be used as a fuel in liquid-propellant ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles.
While not reaching the levels of support provided to Iran and Pakistan, Chinese firms continue to provide North Korea with sporadic shipments of military and dual-use items with potential ballistic missile applications. These are typically sent by ground, often through Dandong. For example, over the past year, a Chinese firm sold Pyongyang types of steel that can be used in the production of SCUD-type ballistic missiles, including steel that we assess is controlled under the MTCR.
China also continues to market the new P12 SRBM to a growing range of customers in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. The P12 SRBM is advertised as a 150-km-range, solid-propellant system carrying a 450 kg warhead, using a dual launcher, with an accuracy of 30-50 meters. Although the system falls below MTCR Category I range and payload thresholds, we remain concerned that a P12 sale might also include access to related production technology that could help advance the buyers domestic ballistic missile production capabilities.
Shortfalls Limit Progress
We have identified several practices and conditions that hinder the effectiveness of Chinas export control enforcement. These include a reluctance to invoke catch-all controls to prevent proliferation-related sales, and lax expectations regarding a firms responsibility to know the bona fides of the end-users for their products.
In many cases involving the transfer of proliferation sensitive cargo to programs of concern, Beijing has shown a reluctance to prohibit the export of an item unless it is specifically listed on Chinas missile-related export control list or the MTCR Annex. Beijing has also demonstrated an unwillingness to hold Chinese firms accountable for fully evaluating end users of a Chinese-origin item. Ensuring that firms are performing due diligence with respect to their customers is particularly critical in deals with Iran, where front companies are often used to mask the ultimate end-users.
We have also raised with the Chinese government our concerns that Chinese seaport facilities and international airports are transit and transshipment points for governments and entities that wish to ship sensitive materials to programs of proliferation concern.
Conclusion
China has made export control progress in recent years. In addition to taking some steps to limit sales of military and dual-use items by Chinese entities that pose proliferation risks, China has engaged in a productive dialogue with the U.S. on export control and nonproliferation issues, including allowing the U.S. to participate in outreach activities to select Chinese companies. However, these positive steps have been offset by some Chinese firms continued support to missile programs in Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan and by Chinas unwillingness to actively utilize its catch-all controls authorities. Chinas lack of consistency in its regulation of exports of missile-related goods and technology will continue to be an impediment to the overall effectiveness of its export controls.
END TEXT OF PAPER.
4. (U) Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR issues for ISN/MTR. A word version of this document will be posted at . RICE
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